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Fifteen and Thirty Five--Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal
Revenue Code: The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a
Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise
By
Philip F. Postlewaite 1
Forthcoming Spring 2009 in the Virginia Tax Review
Service providers (aka executives) to partnerships and to corporations confront a number of
choices as to how their compensatory arrangement may be structured and the tax consequences
thereof. In the simplest case, an individual may render services to an enterprise in return for cash
payments over the period of service. In this non-equity setting, the issue is straightforward and
non-controversial. The service provider is treated as receiving ordinary income for services
rendered. The return on his or her expenditure of human capital is taxed at progressive rates.
Once the relationship between the service provider and the enterprise becomes more
complicated through the service provider’s receipt of an equity interest in the enterprise, the tax
treatment of the return becomes more complex. If the service provider receives an equity interest
in return for services, the issue of whether the receipt of, and return on, the equity interest is
attributable to human capital or invested capital is confronted. A tension arises between
conceptualizing the receipt of and return on an equity interest and the economic enhancement
which it generates as a return on human capital, generating ordinary income, or as a return on
invested capital, which in certain settings may be taxed preferentially as capital gain.
In the corporate context, stock in the corporation may be issued in return for the rendition of
future services. It may be transferred outright, i.e., free and clear, or be restricted, i.e.,
conditioned upon the rendition of services for a fixed period of time. Various tax issues are
confronted—when is the income taken into account, what amount is taken into account, what is
the character of the income from such receipt, and whether and to what extent its compensatory
origin must be segregated from any subsequent appreciation in the equity interest.
Subchapter K raises similar issues in the services-for-equity context regarding partnerships, but
the tax consequences arise under a single tax, rather than double tax, regime for the enterprise.
However, in the partnership context, three types of equity interests may be utilized for
compensatory purposes, i.e., a capital interest with an attendant right to profits, a restricted
capital with profits interest, and a pure profits interest.
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Critics have recently advocated a change in the tax treatment of the return from a compensatory
profits interest in a partnership. They conclude that the current tax treatment of the receipt of and
return on such an interest is seriously flawed, violating fundamental principles of tax policy.
Unfortunately, such advocacy is limited to a narrow analysis of the results generated by a
compensatory receipt of a profits interest and lacks a thorough comparison with, and analysis of,
the treatment of the traditional compensatory equity transfers in the two dominant business
contexts employed in the United States economy, i.e., partnerships and corporations. This Article
provides a broader discussion of compensatory equity transfers (capital interests as well as
profits interests) in the partnership context and discusses the similarities and dissimilarities
between these compensatory arrangements and those arising in the corporate setting. By doing
so, this Article illustrates the erroneous assumption that profits interests derive unique and unfair
tax treatment.
The recent assault on the status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership has gathered
momentum, in large part due to the inflammatory rhetoric which attends the academic
commentary and the focus by the media on the economic success of private equity ventures.
Bills have been introduced in Congress to mandate that such receipts generate ordinary income,
rather than preferential capital gain, to the recipient. To date, none has been enacted. However,
with the economic freefall and the Congressional need to generate additional tax revenues, the
issue of the proper taxation of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership will
likely be revisited in the next legislative session.
By focusing on but one of the five traditional types of available equity transfers (a profits interest),
most of the academic commentary has confused, rather than clarified, the need for reform. The
treatment of the return on human capital and on invested capital has never been as clear or as
singular as commentators suggest. The Code, for sound policy reasons, refrains from
disentangling the return on human capital from the return on invested capital when the service
provider “re-invests” his or her return on human capital in the enterprise by foregoing annual
compensation. With regard to profits interests, the role of § 702(b), which requires that all
partners in a partnership, regardless of how they acquired ownership of their interest,
characterize the nature of their share of the income at the partnership, not the partner, level, is
overlooked. Additionally, compensatory profits interests possess implicit, if not explicit,
restrictions on transfer and thus require treatment akin to that accorded restricted capital interests
in a partnership and restricted corporate stock. Finally, some of the treatment accorded profits
interests is attributable to the fundamental differences between the tax treatment of partnerships
(single level of tax) and corporations (double level of tax), which some critics either minimize or
ignore.
Accordingly, this Article critiques proposals for change with regard to the suggested modification
of the tax treatment of profits interests, in large measure by illustrating the misperception of the
current operation of Subchapter K of the Code and enterprise equity compensation as a whole.
The entire field of compensatory transfers of equity interests and the allocation of the return
therefrom to human capital and/or invested capital is surveyed from a tax policy standpoint. In
this broader context, the status quo (subject to an elective defect) from a normative standpoint is
equal, or superior, to any of the proposals recently advanced.
Finally, with the misdirected emphasis on the tax treatment of profits interests, the real
opportunity for reform of the area is overlooked. The ability to recognize income in the year of
receipt of a restricted compensatory equity interest under § 83(b) permits recipients to minimize
the impact of the progressive rates. This treatment is far more inconsistent with the taxation of
human capital than is the current tax treatment of compensatory profits interests. As a modest
proposal for reform, this Article advances the repeal of § 83(b) which, if enacted, would constitute
significantly broader reform than recent proposals and would result in an overall improvement of
the current tax law from a policy standpoint.
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I. Introduction
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A recent article, entitled “Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private
Equity Funds,” has received significant attention not only in the academic world,
but on Capital Hill as well. 2 The author joined issue with the current tax
treatment of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership. The
article built on prior academic criticism of the current tax treatment of
compensatory transfers of such interests 3 and has spawned additional academic
commentary. 4
This topic is but one piece of a persistent and perplexing policy issue of the tax
law: how is the receipt of a compensatory interest in an enterprise taxed in
cases where the recipient contributes only his or her services toward its
success? What are the tax consequences under current law and is that
treatment consistent across the continuum of possible receipts of compensatory
interests in an enterprise?
Of equal importance, regardless of the current treatment of such receipts, from a
theoretical tax policy standpoint, how should compensatory transfers of
proprietary interests in an enterprise be taxed? Arguably the recipient is
investing exclusively human capital in the endeavor. When should he or she be
taxed and at what rate? What is the relationship, if any, between returns on
human capital and returns on invested capital? When does one end and the
other begin? Is the expenditure of human capital different from the investment of
human capital?
Instead of addressing the tax treatment of compensatory transfers of equity
interests in partnerships and corporations as a whole, critics focus on a detailed
evaluation and critique only of the taxation of compensatory transfers of profits
interests in a partnership. Thus, instead of an overall comparison of each of the
five traditional compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise and an
evaluation of the similarities and differences among them, the analysis is limited
to a single type of compensatory transfer in the partnership context.

2

Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008). Regarding legislative proposals on the topic in the publicly-traded
partnership arena, see Baccus-Grassley Bill, S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007) proposing the
amendment of the definition of publicly traded partnerships under § 7704. See also Tax
Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong., 1st Sess (Oct 25, 2007) at proposed
§ 1201 (proposing the adoption of § 710 requiring that all disproportionate profits interests
generate ordinary income).
3

See, Mark Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L. Rev.
69 (1992); Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services: Let
Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 Tax L. Rev. 287, 312 n. 105 (1991); Laura Cunningham,
Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 Tax L. Rev. 247 (1991).
4

See Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get
Carried Away, 61 Tax L. Rev 121 (2008) (allowing an interest deduction).
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Dissatisfied with the status quo of those tax consequences, a wide range of
proposed improvements are advanced for the area. Regardless of the particular
proposal advanced, as regards the current tax treatment of a compensatory
transfer of a profits interest in a partnership, some assert that “the status quo is
untenable as a matter of tax policy.” 5
Ignoring the adage that “fools rush in where wise men fear to go,” I suggest that
the current tax treatment of a profits interest is in fact logical by illustrating the
consistency of that treatment when integrated into the overall approach of the
Internal Revenue Code with regard to the compensatory receipt of an equity
interest in a business enterprise. Critics examine only part of the evidence in
compiling their case against the status quo. Furthermore, they fail to integrate
the full fabric of Subchapter K and the taxation of partners and partnerships into
their assessment of the area.
While I share their concern about the development of sound tax policy for the
treatment of any and all compensatory receipts, I conclude that the populist
rhetoric is hyperbolic 6 and critics have focused on a small and relatively
insignificant part of the “problem.” 7 The recent, intense scrutiny of a single
industry comprised of private equity firms and hedge funds precludes a full
understanding of the tax consequences of a compensatory receipt of a profits
interest, which in actuality comports with, rather than diverts from, the goals of
sound tax policy. Thus, the conclusion that compensatory transfers of profits
interests in a partnership are treated more favorably than other transfers under
current law is mistaken. 8
5

Fleischer, supra note 2 at 4.

6

See, e.g., Equity Managers’ Loophole; Billion Dollar Breaks, PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, Sept. 17,
2007, at A16; Close This Loophole: Time to Fix ‘Carried Interest’ Tax Dodge, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15,
2007, at A30; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Lori Montgomery, Wall Street’s Lucrative Tax Break Is Under
Fire, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 3, 2007, at A01; Close Hedge Fund Loophole, BOSTON HERALD,
July 29, 2007, at 024; Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, NEW YORK
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at 4; Wealth Money Managers Make More, Get Taxed Less, USA TODAY,
July 23, 2007, at 10A; Tax Breaks for the Rich: Why Should Hedge Fund Managers Pay Less
Than Waitresses?, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, July 14, 2007, at B-7.
7

Criticism of the current treatment of the tax law of compensatory transfers of partnership
interests, as discussed in greater detail below, ignores the factor of risk and how it differentiates
some equity transfers from others; fails to appreciate the Congressional recognition that returns
on human capital are entitled to conversion from ordinary income taxed at the highest progressive
rates to capital gain which is taxed preferentially; minimizes the implicit, if not explicit, restrictions
inherent in a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership; inaccurately assumes
that most profits interests result in a character conversion of the return; and fails to integrate the
legislative purpose behind § 702(b) of characterizing income at the partnership level into their
analysis.
8

See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4: “The conversion of labor income into capital gain is
contrary to the general approach of the Internal Revenue Code and diverges from the treatment
of other compensatory interests. Partnership profits interests are treated more favorably than
other economically similar methods of compensation, such as partnership capital interests,
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The narrowness of this inquiry precludes consideration of the overall proper tax
treatment of human capital in compensatory transfers of equity interests in an
enterprise. The exclusive focus on high-profile, recent developments in a single
industry foreclosed an examination of the entirety of the issue of compensatory
equity transfers across the continuum of business enterprise. 9 In fact, under
current law, returns on human capital frequently become invested capital if not
withdrawn from an enterprise. With a broader focus, the current tax treatment of
such transfers on the whole becomes rational and defensible from a tax policy
standpoint. 10
Finally, the true “theoretical” quirk in the congressional treatment of the area
under current law is the elective provision of § 83(b). This taxpayer option
undermines the proper taxation of human capital and generates greater abuse to
the tax system than the current tax treatment of profits interests in a
partnership. 11

II. Tax Consequences Under Current Law to a Service Provider
of a Compensatory Transfer of an Equity Interest in an
Enterprise
In order to determine whether the tax treatment of a profits interest in a
partnership is more favorable than the treatment of other compensatory transfers
of enterprise equity, a review is necessary of the current treatment of a service
provider upon the receipt of an equity interest in an enterprise in the traditional
contexts, i.e., a corporation, the tax consequences of the use of which are
specified in Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code, and a partnership, the

restricted stock, or at-the-money nonqualified stock options (the corporate equivalent of a
partnership profits interest).”
9

See supra notes 2 and 6. While Congress has permitted the recipients of compensatory
interests in partnerships and corporations generally to be taxed on the return from human capital
at preferential rates, it has deviated from its own treatment through the enactment of the elective
provision of §83(b). I.R.C. § 83(b) (allowing for recognition of restricted property received in
return for services in the year such property was received).
10

See discussion infra at notes 32-62 and accompanying text.

11

Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5: “This quirk in the partnership tax rules allows some of the richest
workers in the country to pay tax on their labor income at a low effective rate.” As discussed infra
at notes 116-117 to and 192-194 and accompanying text, the § 83(b) election permits the
recipient of a restricted compensatory interest to accelerate the time at which the tax
consequences will be taken into account, which thereby affords the recipient the opportunity of
minimizing the amount of income taxed at progressive rates.
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tax consequences of the use of which are specified in Subchapter K. 12 Without
an examination of the topic as a whole, any analysis of the transfer of a
partnership profits interest is incomplete and misleading.
By comparing the results in the partnership and corporate context throughout the
entire range of the traditional types of equity receipts 13 by a service provider, one
can glean the themes for the statutory and regulatory treatment of compensatory
transfers. Thereafter, consistencies and inconsistencies can be identified and
proposals for reform can be advanced or critiqued.
This survey will be generalized and offered in summary form. For those with
greater interest, treatises are available with thorough coverage of the tax
consequences of compensatory transfers of equity interests in partnerships 14
and corporations. 15 Any assessment of the status quo must focus on the various
stages of the service provider’s relationship to his or her enterprise, i.e., from
birth to grave. For purposes of illustration, I will utilize numerical examples
involving simple, and at times somewhat unrealistic, settings. Behavior in the
real world is far more complex. 16 Nevertheless, the simplified settings should
suffice for illustrating why advocates err when they conclude that the current tax
treatment of a compensatory profits interest in a partnership violates sound tax
policy.
A. Pure Employee Status
Advocates for reform typically examine the tax consequences of rendering
services as a pure employee, which is utilized as a baseline and a point of
comparison. In order to grapple with the proper treatment of the return on the
expenditure of human capital, this baseline is compared with the results arising

12

Typically, limited liability companies are taxed as partnerships for tax purposes. See generally
Arthur B. Willis, John S. Pennell, and Philip F. Postlewaite, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION ch 1, 3
(WG&L 6th ed. 1997).

13

The dominant enterprises in the current economic environment through which to conduct profit
making activity are the partnership (which includes limited liability companies) and the
corporation. With respect to traditional compensatory transfers of an equity interest, two are
possible in the corporate context (stock and restricted stock) while three exist in the partnership
context (capital interest, restricted capital interest, and profits interest).
14

See generally Willis et al, supra note 12.

15

See generally Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (WG&L 7th ed 2006).
16

For purposes of comparison, the examples contrast pure employee status with an exclusive
receipt of a compensatory equity interest. In the real world, the latter settings typically involve a
combination of receipts through which the service provider receives both an annual salary or
compensatory payment (“A man’s gotta eat.”) and an interest in the equity of the enterprise.
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when human capital is expended in return for the receipt of an equity interest in
an enterprise.
In the case of pure employee status, the executive draws regular compensation
without sharing in the economic results of the enterprise. The enterprise may
profit immeasurably or teeter on the verge of bankruptcy--increasingly an
everyday experience for even the wealthiest of enterprises. In either case, the
employee is similarly situated and unaffected, except for the possible
discontinuation of his or her employment, by the success or failure of the
enterprise.
Assume that Corporation C and Partnership K both produce $1,000,000 in net
profit annually. Enter highly-paid executives Charlotte and Bob. Charlotte is
hired by Corporation C and Bob by Partnership K. Both enterprises anticipate
that the participation of these top executives in management will generate
sizeable additional profits of $2,000,000, resulting in a net profit of $3,000,000,
through the purchase/expenditure of the executives’ human capital. Accordingly,
each enterprise agrees to an annual salary of $200,000. Both enterprises
experience a 180 percent increase (from $1,000,000 to $2,800,000 17 ) in net
profits after taking the salaries of Charlotte and Bob into account.
Charlotte and Bob derive a financial return on the expenditure of his or her
human capital in the amount of $200,000. Under the current tax law, each will be
taxed annually on the compensation. 18 The tax law characterizes such receipts
as ordinary income. The compensation is not entitled to preferential treatment
under the Code and is taxed at the progressive rates. It is assumed that the
need for survival (food, housing, and other personal needs) affords sufficient
motivation for such recipients to find the economic means through which to
provide for their support. Preferential tax rates theoretically are reserved for
motivational purposes in settings where taxpayers might not otherwise invest.
Accordingly, under current law, compensation, if taxed at the highest rate
currently in force, will carry a maximum rate of 35 percent. Thus, highly-paid
executives receiving an annual salary will not be able to defer its receipt to
another year or convert its characterization to preferentially treated capital gain.
Importantly, after taxes, Charlotte and Bob each will retain $130,000 to spend or
invest as they like.
Possibly of greater importance, their earnings from the first year are not at risk
regardless of the success of their respective enterprises in the future. They are
immune from forces in the marketplace involving their employment and their
17

While the income generated by the enterprise through Charlotte’s and Bob’s expenditure of
human capital increases from $1,000,000 to $3,000,000, expenses increase by the $200,000
salary payment. Thus, the net increase to the enterprise is $2,800,000 ($3,000,000 - $200,000).
18

IRC § 61(a)(1) (2008).
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expenditure of human capital. While job retention may be a consideration, there
is little or no uncertainty as to their overall economic enhancement for the year.
Too often, critics assume that all compensatory relationships are similar, without
meaningful distinction and that the employee baseline should govern the
analysis. In their view, the only issues to be addressed are whether the income
must be taken into account currently or in the future and whether it generates
ordinary income or preferentially treated capital gain upon receipt. Infrequently
do they accord any significance to the existence of risk or the failure to withdraw
“foregone” salary. Given their baseline of employee status, they limit their focus
to the tax treatment upon receipt of the equity interest and ignore the tax
consequences thereafter of the ownership of the equity interest during the
operational and dispositional phases of the investment.
However, a fundamental distinction exists between employee compensation and
equity compensation. 19 In equity ownership contexts, the economic
enhancement, i.e., what the service provider otherwise would have extracted
from the enterprise had he or she been paid, remains with the enterprise. By
contrast, in the employee setting, the economic enhancement (the salary) of the
service provider exits the enterprise. Thus, the issue arises as to whether that
retention by the enterprise attributable to the service provider’s investment of
human capital converts the characterization of the recipients’ return in whole or in
part to invested capital. If so, this would permit the return to be deferred until a
realization event and to be taxed preferentially.
In the equity ownership context, the elements of risk and uncertainty enter the
equation, which further distinguishes the situation from that of the employee. 20
As a consequence, the utilization of the tax consequences of a pure employee
setting for purposes of comparison with compensatory transfers of equity
interests is not identical and thus, is imprecise, at a minimum, and possibly
irrelevant. 21
19

Employee compensation can be viewed as the expenditure of human capital, while equity
compensation involves the investment of human capital.

20

See also Senate Comm. On Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, S.
Prt. No. 169 at 227-28 (Comm. Print 1984) (explaining that partners, unlike non-partner third
parties (such as employees), “extract the profits of the partnership with reference to the business
success of the venture,” while employees “generally receive payments which are not subject to
this risk”).
21

In assessing the variations in compensatory arrangements, settings arise in which the
employee and the enterprise possess a closer relationship than third parties and yet the nature of
the compensatory arrangement is closer to that of a pure employee. A service provider may
possess an ownership interest in the enterprise through a prior contribution of capital in return for
the proprietary interest. In both Subchapter C and Subchapter K, notwithstanding such
ownership, third-party treatment is permitted if the investor is employed by the enterprise to
render services.

9

B. Receipt of a Compensatory Interest in the Equity of an
Enterprise by the Service Provider
Continuing across the continuum of compensatory receipts in a business
enterprise, we encounter settings in which the service provider does not have a
pre-existing or concurrent investment in the enterprise and transacts exclusively
for an equity interest therein in return for the rendition of services. Receiving an
entrepreneurial stake in the enterprise rather than a pure salary makes the issue
of the tax treatment of the return on invested human capital more complex.
An initial distinction with the pure employee model is that the equity interest
transaction involves a payment in kind rather than in cash. Nevertheless, the
equity recipient service provider may possess immediate rights to realize upon
his or her entrepreneurial investment by liquidation or sale of the interest.
Alternatively, the economic ownership of the interest may be conditional and
subject to restrictions. If no limitations are imposed on the full ownership and
transferability of the equity interest, i.e., the recipient’s ownership is vested, two
questions are confronted. Is there a current taxable event on that receipt, and to
what extent are future financial returns from its ownership attributable to human
capital or invested capital?
In our example, if the service provider withdraws from the enterprise on the day
of receipt, he or she would receive the value of his or her interest, which we will
assume to be $500,000. The tax issue under current law is simple as the
transaction is closed. Money in hand, there would be no reason to defer taxation
on the receipt, which would be characterized as ordinary income derived from the
anticipated investment of human capital.
The setting becomes only slightly more problematic where the service provider’s
equity interest is vested with regard to the ownership of his equity interest, and
the service provider continues to provide services to the enterprise. Under the
tax law, in-kind receipts are subject to tax upon receipt with the recognized
In the partnership context, this issue begins to strain the pure employee model. See generally
Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch. 11. In contrast to the corporate context where the enterprise is
taxed separately, a partnership for tax purposes is a conduit, with the income taxed but once to
the partners. While the income is determined in large part utilizing an entity approach, once
determined, it is imputed to its members.
Thus, a payment by a partnership to a partner could be viewed as the rendition of services to
oneself with respect to his or her interest in the partnership and the remainder of the efforts on
behalf of his or her partners. Congress legislatively addressed the issue by specifying third-party
treatment, which results in the full payment constituting income to the recipient which is offset by
the provider’s share of the deduction available to the partnership. The net result is that he or she
is viewed as receiving the payment in part from himself or herself and the remainder from the
other partners.
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difficultly of valuation. That difficulty in our example is easily overcome because
we have stipulated its worth to be $500,000. 22 Thus, gross income of $500,000,
characterized as ordinary income, arises upon the service provider’s receipt of
the equity interest.
Unfortunately, critics conclude that the treatment of this receipt sets the proper
standard for the taxation of the entire return from the receipt of an equity interest
and that any and all additional receipts from its ownership should be treated as
derived from the expenditure of human capital rather than its investment. In the
example, services continue to be rendered to the enterprise and the return on
those efforts almost without exception is not fully measured by the value of the
equity interest on the date of receipt. Issues are confronted as to how the further
return on the receipt attributable to the service provider’s efforts during the
operational and dispositional phase of the ownership is to be treated from a tax
policy standpoint. Under the Code, that return frequently receives preferential
treatment akin to that accorded the return on invested capital.
The service provider must be convinced that the ultimate return on the receipt of
equity will be greater than the present value of a pure salary every year or else
he or she would not accept the equity interest. Thus, future appreciation in the
value of the enterprise may be a part of the return from the investment of human
capital. If so, consistency in their criticism of the current tax treatment for such
receipts would require ordinary income treatment regardless of the timing of the
return because the service provider has contributed only services to the
enterprise. 23 However, seldom is the analysis extended to its logical conclusion.
The service provider’s willingness to render future services without additional
direct recompense results in an increase in the overall assets of the enterprise.
The salary expense which otherwise would have been incurred is no longer a
drain on the corporate or partnership coffers. In the example, a full $200,000,
which otherwise would have been expended by the enterprise, remains for its
use and investment. Thus, future appreciation, if any, in the value of the

22

It is recognized that the value of a compensatory partnership interest may differ from that of
compensatory stock in identically-situated enterprises, because the partnership interest is valued
generally on its liquidation value while the worth of the corporate stock takes other factors into
account. The primary reason for such a distinction is that the partnership interest will impose
additional annual tax consequences upon the holder under § 702(a) which does not occur in the
corporate context. Thus, the use of liquidation value acts as a means of avoiding double taxation.

23

See, e.g., Mark Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L.
Rev. 69 (1992); The Levin Proposal, H.R. 2834 (100th Cong., 1st Sess), introduced by
Representative Sander Levin on June 22, 2007; Aviva Aron-Dine, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, An Analysis of the “Carried Interest” Controversy, available at http://www.cbpp.org/731-07tax.htm.
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enterprise to some extent may be attributable to the invested return of the
retained amounts attributable to the receipt of human capital. 24
At this point, however, only the current tax treatment of such receipts is being
considered. The goal in this portion of the Article is to illustrate the inaccuracy of
the charge that compensatory transfers of partnerships profits interests are
treated more favorably than other compensatory equity transfers. Later in the
discussion, the issue of whether improvements to the Code are necessary will be
addressed.
It is important to understand that the tax law currently fashions a compromise,
frequently treating the overall return on a compensatory transfer of an equity
interest as neither exclusively one on human capital nor one on invested capital.
As we shall see, the current treatment of compensatory transfers comforts itself
with a solution possessing the wisdom of Solomon by treating the taxable
amount on receipt of the equity interest as attributable to human capital and
amounts received thereafter frequently as a return on invested capital.
Regardless of whether this is ideal, an issue explored below, current law permits
it. To alter that treatment solely for the receipt of profits interests in a partnership
would discriminate against such receipts.

III. The Difficulties in Measuring the Return on Human Capital
Much of the difficulty in this area stems from the failure to define what constitutes
a return on human capital in the equity context. Some assume that if an equity
transfer involves the rendition of services, ordinary income taxed at progressive
rates is appropriate for the entire return from its ownership. 25 However, while
their target is the tax treatment of compensatory profits interests in a partnership,
had they addressed other equity receipts, e.g., the receipt of corporate stock,
they would have had to reconcile their advocacy with the bifurcated treatment
under current law requiring ordinary income on the receipt of the interest yet
permitting preferential treatment of the gain upon its disposition.
In other contexts under the current tax law, the investment of human capital in
return for an equity interest in an enterprise does not generate ordinary income.
In fact, such results frequently are the exception, not the rule. Thus, with respect
to a consideration of both the current tax treatment of compensatory equity
receipts and the normative treatment which an improved system would employ, a
24

The transaction could be conceptualized as the enterprise transferring $500,000 in cash to the
service provider as taxable compensation which is then contributed to the enterprise for an
ownership interest. Of course, the service provider would still need to procure additional funds
with which to pay the tax owing of $175,000 (35% x $500,000).
25

See references at note 23 supra.
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definitional issue is confronted. When is a financial return to a service provider
from a business enterprise attributable to the rendition of services and when is it
attributable to invested capital?
Returning to our hypothetical, let us assume that Charlotte and Bob receive an
equity interest in their respective enterprises. In return for the equity interest,
each is willing to assume greater risk for the possibility of a greater return.
Comparing their settings to that of their pure employee counterparts, he and she
are willing to forego an annual salary of $200,000 in return for a 20 percent
equity interest in the enterprise.
Important to the comparison and the analysis is that Charlotte and Bob forego
their annual salary of $200,000. Thus, the enterprise now derives annual income
of $3,000,000, of which Charlotte and Bob are entitled to 20 percent, rather than
the $2,800,000 of net income when they were mere employees. From a pure
economic standpoint, each has increased their economic annual return by 20
percent of the annual income (whatever that may be) derived by the enterprise
over what their salary otherwise would have been. In this case, the economic
increase is $400,000 (20% x $3,000,000 = $600,000 - $200,000).
In isolating the human capital component, one approach is a determination
focused upon the cost of procuring that human capital in the pure employee
context, i.e., at a minimum, the service provider should have $200,000 of
ordinary income per year. He or she continues to render services during the
coming years. However, the future return will also be through appreciation, if
any, in the worth of the enterprise in which they now possess an equity interest.
Under such an approach, the compensatory equity interest holder would be
taxed on $200,000 of ordinary income annually.
A variation on this approach would be the postponement of the realization of the
return on human capital until actual receipt, by distribution or from the sale or
liquidation of the interest, of cash or property with the amount received
attributable first to a return on human capital over the period during which
services were rendered. The remainder, if any, would be viewed as a return on
invested capital. In our example, if the service provider rendered services for
four years and then sold or liquidated the interest for $2,700,000, the first
$800,000 ($200,000 per year times four years) under this approach would be
ordinary income and the remainder capital gain.
Another approach would be to treat everything received from the ownership of
the equity interest as constituting a return on human capital taxed at progressive
rates. Whether a current or liquidating distribution, any and all returns would be
ordinary income because the totality of his or her “contribution” to the enterprise
was of services only. The parties transacted for the rendition of services, and
thus any return derives from the expenditure of human capital. Using the
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example, if the interest were sold for $2,700,000, ordinary income in that amount
would arise.
Another variation from which to choose would be the determination of the return
on human capital at the time of the receipt of the interest, based on its current
value. Everything thereafter in excess of that amount would be treated as
attributable to invested capital and taxed preferentially. Thus, if the interest were
worth $500,000 upon the grant, it would be taxed upon receipt as ordinary
income and the recipient thereafter would be entitled to capital gain, regardless
of the nature of the activities of the enterprise. 26
Some of these variations are premised on the assumption that the return on
human capital is determined exclusively by the rendition of services. Others
accord significance to the fact that the funds which the service provider would
have otherwise extracted from the enterprise have instead remained/were reinvested in the enterprise. 27 To what extent, if any, should an approach
acknowledge that future appreciation in the enterprise may be attributable to the
extra amounts now available to the enterprise for investment and use in the
ongoing business activities? 28
The purpose of the above discussion is to illustrate the range of the possible tax
treatments of the return from the investment of human capital in return for an
equity interest in an enterprise. More importantly, before one can assail the
particular tax treatment of a compensatory receipt of an equity interest as
aberrational, the contours of the guidelines for making the determination of what
26

Current law is identical to this variation in the corporate context, but the treatment of the
additional return in the partnership context turns on the nature of the profits generated by the
enterprise. If the partnership generates business income from its daily operations, the entirety of
the excess over the initial value would be taxed at the progressive rates and would be included in
income on an annual basis.
27

Cf. IRC § 704(e) in the family partnership context.

28

If the tax treatment is premised on the assumption that the future return from ownership is
attributable to the invested capital which the service provider has committed to the enterprise by
leaving his return on human capital for the use of the enterprise, different results ensue. Failing
to withdraw compensation from the enterprise has economic significance and arguably converts
the investment from one of human capital to one of invested capital.
Other variations are possible, including a bifurcated approach in the year of receipt. For example,
$130,000 could be attributable to human capital, i.e., the after tax amount in the pure employee
setting, and the remainder ($70,000 of tax owing) attributable to invested capital. In contrast to
the pure employee setting in which he or she has the cash (most likely, it has been withheld by
the employer and paid directly to the Service), the service provider has received only an
ownership interest in an enterprise. Utilizing these ratios, taxation could be postponed until
realization and, similar to the tax treatment for installment sales, 65 percent would be attributable
to the rendition of services and taxed accordingly at ordinary rates, while the remaining 35
percent would be a return on invested capital and taxed preferentially.
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constitutes a return on human capital must be specified. To date, critics have
generally avoided the issue. 29
Regardless of whether the issue of how to treat the overall return on the
compensatory receipt of an equity interest generates unanimity of opinion as to
its determination and treatment from a tax policy standpoint, the above
discussion illustrates that a number of differing approaches have some logical
basis for their adoption. The purity and simplicity of the employee setting has
been replaced with complexity in the compensatory equity interest setting. The
latter category involves the difficulty of disentangling the mixture of contributed
human capital and the re-investment of the return as invested capital.
Notwithstanding this range of possibilities and the normative arguments which
can be advanced regarding the improvement of the current treatment by the
adoption of any of the approaches, the current approach under the Code is to
value the property interest upon its receipt by the service provider and treat only
that amount as a return on human capital in the year of receipt. Any additional
return is considered as attributable to invested capital. Thus, the $500,000 worth
of an equity interest in the examples above is ordinary income in Year 1,
resulting in a basis of an equal amount to the service provider for his
“investment.” Any amount received thereafter (whether operational or
dispositional) frequently is a return on invested capital. 30 Thus, under current law,
the initial receipt caps the return on human capital, and much of the future return
is treated as flowing from invested capital.
At a minimum, try as one may, the two settings, pure employee rendering
services for cash and service provider rendering services for an equity interest in
the enterprise, are not comparable. Significant distinctions exist with respect to
the degree of risk, time of ownership, and types of return. The ownership of
stock in a corporation or a capital interest in a partnership permits a second
possible stream of an ongoing economic return, i.e., dividends with respect to the
stock and profits with respect to the capital interest, as well as gain upon
disposition of the interests. 31 Accordingly, the tendency to utilize the pure
29

See Fleischer, supra, note 2.

30

This treatment does not guaranty preferential treatment in the partnership context due to the
presence of § 702(b) which characterizes the income by the activities of the enterprise and
imputes that characterization to all regardless of whether the partner contributed invested capital
or human capital. However, preferential treatment is assured in the corporate context.
Importantly, in the partnership context, it is possible to derive ordinary income or capital gain
during the operational and/or dispositional phase of the equity ownership, regardless of whether
the partner is a service provider or a capital investor.

31

I fully recognize, and emphasize in the text, that loss is a possibility. Nevertheless, to achieve
an economy of verbiage and to illustrate general misconceptions, except where necessary, I will
typically reference and address the positive side of such investments and assume that gain is
forthcoming.
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employee setting as the basis for comparison is inappropriate. Instead, the
treatment of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership should
be compared with the results of compensatory transfers of other equity interests
in business enterprises.

A. Unrestricted Equity Interests in Corporations or
Partnerships—Treatment in Year of Receipt
In this variation, the compensatory grant to the service provider of stock in a
corporation or a capital interest in a partnership is assumed to be without
restriction or conditions. Thus, Charlotte and Bob receive entrepreneurial
interests without conditions, e.g., a four-year period of service before the interest
vests. Under the current tax law, unrestricted transfers of equity interests differ
dramatically from restricted transfers with regard to risk, time of vesting, and
economic significance. Accordingly, such differences under current law justify
differing tax treatment.
An unrestricted ownership interest permits the recipient to exit the enterprise
without penalty, e.g., one week later, should he or she decide to move in a
“different direction” and seek an affiliation with another enterprise. Because the
equity interest vested upon receipt, Charlotte or Bob possess the right to
terminate the relationship with Corporation C or Partnership K at any time. Given
the nature of their economic bargain with the enterprise, they are entitled to free
and clear ownership of their equity interest. Upon their exit, they have a glorious
windfall--$500,000 in hand, receiving virtually “something for nothing” as they
worked but a fraction of their expected, albeit not required, tenure.
The enterprises will never receive the benefits of their labor, and Charlotte and
Bob will have derived an economic windfall. Even the classification of their
receipts in tax policy terms is difficult because they never rendered significant
services to the enterprises. Is this a return on human capital, invested capital, or
a third category of a pure windfall? At a minimum, this component of the overall
economic bargain documents the complexity in attempting to draw consistent
lines in the treatment of the receipt of compensatory equity interests from the
standpoint of sound tax policy principles.
The tax treatment of such receipts is settled under current law and, in the year of
receipt, closely approximates the tax treatment of the pure employee. Charlotte
and Bob both have ordinary income in the amount of $500,000 taxed at a rate of
35 percent. 32 Under existing Regulations, Charlotte and Bob both receive a

32

Some suggest that the deduction available to the enterprise is important to the analysis. See
Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get Carried
Away, 61 Tax L. Rev. 121 (2008) (allowing an interest deduction); Fleischer, supra note 2, at n.56
(denying an interest deduction); Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for
Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 Tax L. Rev. 287, 312 n. 105 (1991) (also
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basis in the enterprise of $500,000, which at a minimum gives the appearance
that a conversion from human capital to invested capital occurs. 33 As we will
see, gain on the subsequent sale or liquidation of the interest is treated as a
return on invested capital and taxed preferentially even though the grant was for
the rendition of services. 34
Critics suggest that a compensatory receipt of an equity interest produces the
same results as those generated in the pure employee context. 35 They content
themselves with an assessment of the tax treatment of the initial receipt of the
equity interest; in our example, each has $500,000 of ordinary income. However,
if the quest is for the proper tax treatment of the return on human capital, then a
more thorough inspection of the totality of the ownership period is required. By
doing so, one discovers that significant distinctions exist between the employee
and the equity setting.
Due to their in-kind receipt, Charlotte and Bob have a tax obligation on the value
of their economic enhancement, which requires the use of funds from other
sources in order to meet their tax liabilities. More importantly, they are not
similarly situated to their employee counterparts, because future appreciation in
the value of the enterprise as well as potential earnings from its operations may
inure to their benefit during the ownership period.

denying an interest deduction). However, for purposes of my analysis, I have chosen to avoid
that aspect of compensatory transfers of equity interests.
33

See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-2 (d) and 1.83-2(a).

34

Critics take as a given the similarity in treatment of the tax consequences of the receipt of a
compensatory interest in equity, regardless of whether it is in a corporation or a partnership.
However, such is not the case. In the corporate context, once the receipt is taken into account,
everything thereafter is taxed preferentially if the holding period requirement of more than one
year has been met. Future dividends from the enterprise and gain on the sale of the stock are
treated preferentially. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2008) (dividends taxed at long-term capital gain rate for
individuals); I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (defining capital asset and specifying holding period threshold
for long-term and short-term capital gain or loss).

In the partnership setting, such treatment will not arise in every case. The return on a partnership
interest is annual as each member must report his share of the partnership’s operations for the
business year. I.R.C. § 706(a) (2008). Additionally, upon the sale or liquidation of the interest, an
aggregate “look-through” approach which focuses on the nature of the assets held by the
partnership comes into play. I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (2008) (gain or loss recognized on the sale of
an interest in a partnership treated as attributable to the sale of a capital asset, except to the
extent that it reflects gain or loss in the ordinary income assets of the partnership). In contrast to
the corporate model utilizing an entity approach and thus generating capital gain, the partnership
model is capable of producing ordinary income on the sale or liquidation of the interest. I.R.C.
§ 751(a) (2008).
35

See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3-4. Cf. Schmolka, supra note 3 at 105 (suggesting the taxation
of carried interest be modeled after Subchapter S).
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An analysis which limits its tax policy comparisons to the first year only is
incomplete. More is required. Charlotte and Bob receive their economic
interests in return for an obligation to continue rendering services into the future.
Assuming that they do so annually, without additional recompense and without
the payment of dividends or the derivation of additional profits, future
appreciation or depreciation may occur in the value of the enterprise. Given their
equity ownership, they will share in the success or failure of the enterprises.
Critics fail to distinguish between the tax consequences of the receipt of
unrestricted corporate stock and those derived from the receipt of an unrestricted
capital interest in a partnership. The tax consequences diverge dramatically
depending upon which interest the service provider receives.
The ownership interest in a corporation and one in a partnership are
fundamentally and philosophically different. 36 I have previously complained of
the increasing tendency to conflate Subchapter K with Subchapter C. 37 Too
frequently, commentators assert that consistent treatment must arise in both
areas. They apparently assume that the Subchapter C treatment for a particular
transaction is the same as that which arises under Subchapter K, which is not the
case. Instead, in many areas, significant differences between the two exist.
Regarding the current taxation of operational earnings, these fundamental
differences are evidenced by the governance of the entity approach for
corporations and the aggregate/conduit approach for partnerships. The service
provider in the partnership setting, in contrast to his or her counterpart in the
corporate context, has additional tax consequences on an annual basis. In the
corporate context, without the payment of dividends, no additional tax
consequences will take place on an annual basis during the operational phase of
the equity ownership. 38
Returning to the example and comparing the treatment accorded Charlotte and
Bob, their treatment begins to diverge by the end of the first year. Charlotte has
$500,000 of ordinary income in Year 1 and an attendant basis of an equivalent
amount for the stock. Unless dividends are paid, she will have no further tax
consequences until the sale or redemption of the stock. All amounts in excess of
her basis of $500,000 will be entitled to preferential tax treatment. Earnings of
the corporation will be subject to a first level of tax and Charlotte will have a
second level imposed upon her.

36

Compare Willis et. al., supra note 12 at ch 9 with Bittker and Eustice, supra note 15.

37

See Philip F. Postlewaite, The Transmogrification of Subchapter K, 83 Taxes Magazine—The
University of Chicago Tax Conference 189 (2005).

38

In the interest of simplicity, the paper does not address these issues in the S corporation
context.
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Bob receives very different treatment after the receipt of his equity interest in the
partnership. While he too has $500,000 of ordinary income and an equivalent
basis for his partnership interest, he also has a profits interest in the partnership.
If he received a capital interest equal to 20 percent of the partnership’s capital,
most likely he received an equivalent interest in profits and losses. While
flexibility is the hallmark of partnership taxation and the parties can agree to
variations in which the percentage interest in profits of a partner can exceed his
interest in capital, for purposes of illustration, we will assume that the percentage
interests for Bob in profits, capital, and losses of the partnership are 20 percent.
Accordingly, at year end, under § 702, he will include 20 percent of the
partnership’s income for the year on his personal return and pay tax on that
income as characterized at the partnership level.
Assuming the partnership is earning $3,000,000 per year, per the example
above, Bob will report annually 20 percent of that amount, i.e., $600,000, as
additional income under § 702(a). Furthermore, the income will be characterized
at the partnership level pursuant to the legislative instruction of § 702(b). Thus,
depending upon the character of the income to the partnership, Bob’s 20 percent
share of the income could range from exclusively ordinary income to exclusively
long-term capital gain to any combination in between dependent upon the
activities of the partnership. In our example, Bob would report the $600,000 as
ordinary income annually.
Importantly, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, the service provider in the
partnership context, Bob reporting $600,000 of income annually (his 20 percent
share in profits), is treated differently than his counterpart in the corporate
context, where Charlotte is reporting $0 annually. Neither party will report the
same amount of income over the life of their equity ownership in the enterprise.
Furthermore, Charlotte indirectly will bear her share of the corporate tax, 34
percent of the $3,000,000, on an annual basis, since her amount realized on the
sale or liquidation of the stock will reflect the reduction in the amount of corporate
assets due to the payment of its tax obligations.
Additionally, Charlotte will report the amount received on liquidation or sale, to
the extent it exceeds the basis for the stock of $500,000, exclusively as long-term
capital gain. Bob, reporting the same $500,000 in Year 1, will report $600,000
annually, as ordinary income or capital gain depending upon the character of the
income to the partnership, which will increase his basis for his partnership
interest. The sale or liquidation proceeds less the increased basis will be taxed
at the same time as Charlotte’s, but in contrast to Charlotte, it is far from certain
that the entirety of any gain will receive preferential treatment. The aggregateentity approach of Subchapter K possesses additional safeguards through § 751
to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain which no longer
exist in Subchapter C. 39
39

See Willis et. al., supra note 12 at ch. 14.

19

Of critical importance, as illustrated above, the settings are not similar.
Corporations and partnerships function differently for tax purposes, and the duallevel of taxation attendant to the corporate enterprise differs dramatically from the
single-level tax on an annual basis inherent in the treatment of partnerships. 40
They are fundamentally different, 41 which is why direct comparisons between the
two for a “snapshot” period of their existence are misleading.
In summary, assume that Charlotte and Bob received their interests, valued at
$500,000 at the close of business on December 31, Year 1. They each spend
the next four years with their respective enterprises before selling their interests
on December 31, Year 5. During each of those years, the enterprises earned
$3,000,000. When Charlotte and Bob received their 20 percent equity interests,
they were worth $500,000, which resulted in $500,000 of ordinary income to
each. 42
As noted above, Bob reports $600,000 annually as his share of the profits and
under Subchapter K adjusts his basis in order to ensure that he is not taxed twice
on the same income. At the end of the ownership period, he sells his interest for
$2,900,000, assuming no unrealized appreciation of assets, and reports no
additional gain. 43 Thus, in the partnership setting, in addition to the $500,000 of
ordinary income upon receipt, Bob has reported income annually (even though
there have been no distributions made to him), without the benefit of deferral,
and, depending upon the activities of the partnership over this four-year period,
characterized either as ordinary or capital.

40

See Postlewaite, supra note 37, complaining of efforts to ignore the fundamental differences
between Subchapter K and Subchapter C.
41

See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5, 10, & 18 (drawing direct comparisons between
partnerships and corporations and calling for consistency between the two forms).
42

The corporate interest was anticipated to be less profitable than actually occurred.
Accordingly, the value on receipt equaled the value of the partnership taking into account various
factors in addition to liquidation value. Thereafter, to Charlotte’s good fortune, the corporation
proved to be more profitable than anticipated.

43

The examples are simplified for purposes of comparison and differ dramatically from the real
world. Constant earnings are assumed over a four-year period in a world without inflation.
Furthermore, the assets of the enterprise are assumed to stay constant in value without
appreciation or depreciation. All of these factors are confronted in the conduct of real world
business operations. One could integrate further assumptions into the examples in order to
comport with the real world. However, the general tax consequences illustrated by the examples
would not change.
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Government statistics suggest that approximately 3,000,000 tax returns are filed
by partnerships annually. 44 Most likely, a 20 percent equity interest in a majority
of those enterprises would produce a sizeable amount of ordinary income
annually, particularly in business, as opposed to investment, enterprises such as
law and accounting firms.
Given the fundamental difference between the taxation of corporations and
partnerships, Charlotte’s results differ from Bob’s. While reporting an equivalent
amount of ordinary income in Year 1, she reports nothing for the next four years.
Her basis for her corporate stock is $500,000. Her sales price for her interest
would be $2,084,000 ($600,000 share of annual earnings less corporate tax at
34 percent rate of $204,000 times four years plus $500,000 value of initial
receipt). Charlotte would be taxed at preferential rates on $1,584,000
($2,084,000 - $500,000) of gain.
Thus, in total amounts taxed to each, Charlotte is taxed on $2,084,000 and Bob
$2,900,000. Of those amounts, the character of Charlotte’s is $500,000 ordinary
and $1,584,000 as capital gain. Bob’s is $2,900,000 as ordinary income. Bob
“derived” income annually over the full four-year period while Charlotte did not.
Without time value considerations, Bob’s net income after taxes is $1,885,000
($2,900,000 less taxes at a rate of 35 percent of $1,015,000). 45 Charlotte’s is
$1,631,400 ($2,084,000 less taxes of $412,600 ($500,000 at 35 percent,
$175,000, and $1,584,000 at 15 percent, $237,600)).
At a minimum, Charlotte and Bob clearly are not taxed similarly on the overall
return from their investment of human capital. Differences arise regarding when
they are taxed, the character of the return and the rate at which it is taxed, and
the impact of an entity level tax.

B. Restricted Compensatory Transfers of Corporate Stock or
Partnership Capital Interest—Year of Vesting
The more likely scenario with regard to compensatory transfers of equity
interests involves the imposition of various restrictions prior to the vesting of
ownership in the service provider. Fearing the consequences described above,
i.e., the departure of the service provider with current rights to the equity of the
enterprise without the rendition of the bargained for services, the more typical
setting involves a transfer of the equity interest conditioned upon the completion
44

For example, in 2006, 2.9 million partnership tax returns were filed. See Internal Revenue
Service, Tax Facts at a Glance, available online at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102886,00.html.
45

If the income generated by the partnership had been long-term capital gain, Bob would have
been taxed at a 15 percent rate on his annual income, thereby reducing the overall tax liability
and increasing his net income after taxes to $2,265,000.
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of a fixed period of service before vesting, e.g., four years. Upon the fulfillment of
the conditions, ownership of the interest is transferred to the service provider.
The tax law has addressed the treatment of restricted compensatory transfers of
equity interests in § 83. Utilizing the fact patterns described above, i.e., the grant
of a 20 percent interest in either corporate stock or partnership capital
conditioned upon four years of service, which at the time of the grant was worth
$500,000 without regard to the restriction, the tax consequences to the service
provider are postponed. The restrictions are such that the tax law does not
equate such a receipt as true and complete current ownership of the equity
interest.
From a tax policy standpoint, this is a logical and sound approach. The Supreme
Court in Commissioner vs. Glenshaw Glass Co. held that “accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, over which the taxpayer exercises complete dominion and
control” constitute gross income. 46 The tax law embraces the concept of
realization. If one does not currently possess all rights to ownership, income is
generally deferred until a time at which the economic enhancement is clear and
certain.
The tax consequences of the transaction differ dramatically from those involving
the transfer of unrestricted equity interests. In the case of restricted transfers, at
the time of the transfer, there is no certainty of vesting. Actual ownership is
dependent upon future events which are uncertain and subject to risk.
Accordingly, postponing the tax consequences is logical, even though the value
of the potential receipt is certain at the time of the grant, until the transaction
equates with the compensatory transfer of an unrestricted interest. Tax
consequences should be suspended until the point in time at which the recipient
has complete dominion and control over the equity interest. At that time, he or
she possesses the same ability to insist upon a share of the assets of the
enterprise through sale or liquidation as does the recipient of an unrestricted
equity interest.
Under the Code, 47 no tax consequences ensue for restricted equity transfers until
the conditions have been fulfilled and the property vests (Year 4 in our example).
Upon the completion of the service requirement, the service provider is taxable
on the value of the stock or the partnership interest at that time. As the transfer
involved a 20 percent interest in the enterprise, that percentage of the overall
valuation of the enterprise at the end of Year 4 is includable in the service
provider’s income as ordinary income. The 20 percent interest, which initially

46

348 U.S. 426, 431 (1961).

47

IRC § 83(a) (2008).
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had a value of $500,000, has appreciated to a liquidation value of $2,900,000 if
the enterprise is a partnership and a value of $2,084,000 if a corporation. 48
From a theoretical tax policy standpoint, the presence of the restriction generated
a greater return on human capital, $2,900,000 or $2,084,000 rather than
$500,000 in the case of unrestricted receipts. Under the current tax law, the
service providers would take a basis of $2,900,000 and $2,084,000 in the
enterprise respectively upon vesting.
Future appreciation in the value of the enterprise is considered to be a return on
invested capital, even though Charlotte and Bob continue to render services to
the enterprise. 49 Had the critics extended their scrutiny of compensatory
transfers of equity interests past the point of initial receipt, they might complain
that human capital by such tax treatment is improperly being converted to
investment capital because the service provider’s commitment to the enterprise
has been nothing more than the rendition of services, i.e., the investment of
human capital. 50 However, they would also have to acknowledge that the
conversion feature which they deem to be unacceptable in the profits interest
context exists in other types of compensatory transfers of enterprise equity
interests.
Importantly, the overall results for Bob in the partnership context, if the
partnership’s earnings are characterized as ordinary income, may be identical to
the tax consequences which would have arisen if the compensatory transfer of
the equity interest had been unrestricted. The overall results for Charlotte, and
48

As the enterprise earned $3,000,000 per year over four years, none of which was distributed,
the overall appreciation totaled $12,000,000 in the partnership context. Of that amount, a 20
percent interest would be entitled to $2,400,000, which when combined with the initial valuation
on the date of the grant of $500,000 would total $2,900,000. In the corporate context, the value
at the end of four years would be reduced by the amount of the corporate tax, resulting in a value
of $2,084,000.
Additional complexity arises due to the differences in valuing the receipt of a partnership interest
and corporate stock. Liquidation value typically controls in the partnership context while
additional factors come into play in the corporate context. While an integration of these factors
could change the numbers of our examples, the general conclusions would be unaffected.
Technically, the enterprise would be entitled to a deduction for the amount included in income
(I.R.C. § 162(a) (2008)) which would alter the results somewhat in the corporate context by
lessening the tax liability on the corporation and thereby increasing Charlotte’s share of the worth
of the corporation. In the interest of simplicity, this additional adjustment has been omitted. In
the partnership context, the deduction would be allocated to the other partners (I.R.C. § 83(h)
(2008)) and thus Bob’s results should be unchanged.

49

As noted above, in the partnership context, a return on invested capital does not always
generate capital gain.

50

We will return to consider the mischief caused by the § 83(b) election. See infra at notes 190194 and accompanying text.
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Bob if the partnership annually derives long-term capital gain income, are
dramatically worse in the restricted setting, because the entirety of the income
received will be taxed as ordinary income at the rate of 35 percent, rather than
the preferred rate of 15 percent. Importantly, this analysis illustrates differing tax
consequences for the same receipt due exclusively to its restricted status.

C. Compensatory Receipts of Profits Interests in Partnerships
Compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise differ in the corporate
world of Subchapter C and the partnership world of Subchapter K. In the
corporate world, typically the enterprise can transfer an interest in stock only,
whether common or preferred. 51 It is generally not possible under the tax law to
transfer rights to dividends of a corporation without transferring the stock.
In the partnership context, the enterprise and its members are subject to a
different taxing regime designed for the imposition of a single level of tax.
Taxation takes place when income is derived by the enterprise and is taxed not
to the enterprise but instead to the members, regardless of whether the income is
distributed to them. Furthermore, the characterization of the income earned by
the partnership is determined at the partnership level without regard to the
business activities of its partners and their degree of involvement in the conduct
of the partnership’s operations. 52
Another facet of partnership taxation ignored by some is that capital interests are
accompanied by profits interests regardless of whether the equity interest is
acquired in return for capital contributions or in return for the rendition of
services. It is misleading to describe a service provider as receiving only a
capital interest. Without exception, a capital interest and a profits interest in the
partnership is received by the service provider.
However, it is also possible for a partnership to transfer an equity interest in
profits only to the service provider. The distinction between the receipt of a
profits interest and that of a capital interest is that the latter has liquidation value
at the time of receipt while the former does not. As illustrated above, a profits
interest is dependent upon the future successful conduct of the partnership’s
business in order to produce an economic return to its holder. Significantly, a
capital interest has liquidation value upon receipt; a profits interest does not.
Accordingly, a “pure” profits interest, i.e., one not tied to an interest in capital, is
not taxed upon receipt. The reason for this treatment is the difficulty in valuation,
51

Income earned in the corporate context is potentially subject to an additional level of taxation.
Dividend distributions or gain from the sale or liquidation of the stock will precipitate the
imposition of another tax on the corporate earnings.
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I.R.C. § 702(b) (2008).
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the lack of certainty that anything will be received, and the complexity arising
from the potential for “double taxation,” i.e., once upon receipt followed by a
second tax as earned. 53 Arguably, such an interest is implicitly, if not explicitly, a
restricted interest. Only as services are rendered is the service provider entitled
to the receipt of a share of the profits generated.
Significantly, a profits interest at year end, if the profits are not withdrawn,
transforms in the following year into an interest in capital as well as an interest in
profits. The prior year’s undistributed profits become an interest in partnership
capital in Year 2. Thus, most recipients of pure profits interests after the year of
receipt also possess an interest in partnership capital.
The Service in 1993 removed any doubt about the income inclusion and
valuation issues of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest with its
publication of Revenue Procedure 93-27. 54 Therein, the Service held that the
receipt of such an interest generally does not constitute a taxable event either for
the partner or for the partnership. Focusing upon the rights of such a service
provider, if liquidation occurred the next day, he or she would be entitled to
nothing. The service provider would walk away from the partnership emptyhanded. As a consequence, the Service concluded that there is no policy
rationale for current taxation. 55
Using the same example as above but with Bob receiving only a 20 percent
interest in profits, there are no tax consequences upon the receipt of the interest.
Bob would report $600,000 of income per year for the four-year period, subject to
either a 35 percent or a 15 percent rate of tax depending upon the character of
the partnership’s income determined at the partnership level. Significantly, the
tax consequences for the compensatory receipt of the profits interest and the
compensatory receipt of an unrestricted capital interest are identical in every
respect except for the additional liquidation value of the interest to which the
service provider is entitled on the date of receipt of a capital interest.

53

As explained below, double taxation will never occur due to the built-in “homeostasis factor”
inherent in Subchapter K. See discussion infra at note 177. However, time value and possible
character distortions may attend taxation upon receipt.
54

1993-2 C.B. 343.
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Three exceptions were provided in the release, each of which involves variations undercutting
the underlying premise that the interest is uncertain of value. Regulations have been proposed,
accompanied by a proposed Revenue Procedure, to further embrace this treatment with an
expansion of the present treatment as well as a consideration of particular problem areas
regarding the forfeiture of a compensatory interest for which there was a lack of guidance. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. Preamble 5-24-2005 and Notice 2005-43.
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Notwithstanding advocacy to the contrary, 56 compensatory receipts of profits
interests in a partnership are not treated more favorably than transfers of capital
interests in a partnership under current tax law. 57 Upon receipt, they are taxed
on the basis of their current liquidation value, because all future economic to the
interest will be taxed to the holder currently as realized by the partnership under
Subchapter K. After receipt, their treatment is identical.
A receipt of a compensatory capital interest in a partnership possesses current
liquidation value while a profits interest does not. As the enterprise conducts
business operations, both the holder of a compensatory capital interest and the
holder of a compensatory profits interest will take their share of profits into
account annually. Furthermore, the future value of the profits to be generated by
the partnership is not taken into account upon receipt of the interest due to the
conduit treatment of the enterprise. As illustrated above, both recipients will be
taxed on the same amount of future earnings, at the same time, and at the same
character. The only difference in tax consequence will be the liquidation value of
the initial receipt, which is attributable to something that the profits interest holder
will never receive and thus upon which he or she should not be taxed. 58

D. Dispositional Return on Compensatory Transfers of Equity
Interests
An additional return may arise to the holder of a compensatory equity interest on
its disposition through liquidation or sale. In the case of a capital interest, once
vested, any appreciation in the assets of the partnership will impact the value of
the interest. Depending upon the composition of the partnership assets, capital
gain characterization is likely, but ordinary income is possible as well upon the
disposition of the partnership interest. 59 Importantly, under § 706(c) of the Code,
the taxable year closes on the date that the interest is retired or sold. The results
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Fleischer, supra note 2 at 12; Schmolka, supra note 3, at 289. In the case of a restricted
interest, the availability of a § 83(b) election results in the minimization of any difference between
the receipt of a capital interest and a profits interest.
57

See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4: “The conversion of labor income into capital gain is
contrary to the general approach of the Internal Revenue Code and diverges from the treatment
of other compensatory interests. Partnership profits interests are treated more favorably than
other economically similar methods of compensation, such as partnership capital interests,
restricted stock, or at-the-money nonqualified stock options (the corporate equivalent of a
partnership profits interest).”
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Significantly, many recipients of a restricted capital interest will receive similar treatment,
because they will avail themselves of the § 83(b) election in order to minimize the ordinary
income component upon receipt.
59

IRC §§ 741, 751(a) (2008). See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at chs. 12 and 14.
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for the year are tallied and allocated to the exiting partner and may result in
varying amounts of ordinary income and/or capital gain.
In the corporate context, future appreciation in the value of the stock generates
capital gain on the sale or liquidation of the stock, regardless of the nature of the
underlying corporate assets. Thus, a shareholder of a corporation with
significant inventory which if sold by the corporation would generate ordinary
income is entitled to capital gain on the sale of his or her stock. The return
generates preferential treatment even though the stock was issued exclusively in
return for the rendition of services.

E. Summary of the Current Tax Treatment of Compensatory
Transfers of Equity Interests
This brief overview of the tax law’s treatment of compensatory transfers of equity
interests in an enterprise is an important prerequisite to an assessment of
criticism regarding the current state of the law and its treatment of the transfer of
compensatory equity interests. As illustrated, there are five traditional types of
equity interests which can be received in the future by a service provider
exclusively in return for the rendition of services—corporate stock, restricted
corporate stock, partnership capital interest, restricted partnership capital
interest, and partnership profits interest.
Under the current tax law, there are differences in the overall treatment between
compensatory transfers of corporate equity interests and partnership equity
interests. Thus, the assumption that there is uniform tax treatment for the return
on human capital through the receipt of equity interests in an enterprise is
erroneous. Importantly, the treatment of compensatory partnership profits
interests is not a “quirk” and is not unique.
An appreciation of the current tax treatment for the compensatory transfer of all
five interests is essential in order to evaluate proposals for reform and
improvement of the status quo. Too frequently, the entirety of the events which
constitute the return on the service provider’s investment of human capital is
ignored. Instead, the focus is limited to the tax consequences upon receipt. 60
Accordingly, many assumptions and assertions about the current state of the law
are inaccurate and such criticism is premised on a faulty foundation.
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See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 10 (looking only to tax treatment upon receipt of the
profits interest to conclude that current tax law is in this regard counterintuitive and inconsistent
with treatment of other “equivalent” methods of compensation); Schmolka, supra note 3,
(proposing proper tax treatment upon receipt based upon whether the service partner was acting
in its capacity as partner in performance of the services). See generally Aron-Dine, supra note 23
(treating receipt of a profits interest as comparable to receipt of any other type of compensation
and decrying the perceived unfairness of taxation of the former at preferential rates).
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To summarize, pure employee status results in a fixed and certain monetary
receipt, taxed as ordinary income. 61 With respect to compensatory equity
interests in an enterprise, the current treatment under the tax law of such receipts
is settled.
In the corporate context, the entirety of the return to the service provider is never
exclusively ordinary income. Instead ordinary income is mandated for the receipt
of the equity interest 62 to the extent of its value and capital gain arises on its
disposition. Unless there is a payment of dividends, no other tax consequences
are forthcoming during the interim. Thus, under the current tax law, the entirety
of the return on the investment of human capital is not taxed at progressive rates.
In the partnership context, ordinary income to the extent of liquidation value is
similarly derived upon receipt of an equity interest, ordinary income and/or capital
gain arises annually during the ownership period dependent upon the operations
of the enterprise, and ordinary income and/or capital gain is recognized upon its
disposition dependent upon the nature of the assets held by the enterprise.
Again, under the current tax law, the entirety of the return on the investment of
human capital is not necessarily taxed at progressive rates. In fact, postacquisition returns in the partnership context will more likely be taxed at
progressive rates than in the corporate context. However, current law does not
mandate taxation of the entirety of the return at progressive rates.
In keeping with the three-fold purpose of this Article, the goal has been initially to
examine thoroughly the current state of the law and to illustrate that the issue of
the return on human capital and return on invested capital, while clear upon the
receipt of an equity ownership interest, becomes intertwined over the life of the
ownership of the equity interest. The two concepts meld together, and there is
no effort to disentangle them after the receipt of the equity interest in the
enterprise.

61

Identical treatment is derived by service providers who possess an equity interest and
negotiate with their enterprise on an arm’s length basis to receive a fixed and certain monetary
amount for services provided to their enterprise. They possess a dual relationship with their
enterprise as both an equity interest holder and a service provider compensated directly for his or
her labor.
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If the interest is restricted, the value is determined when the conditions are fulfilled and the
ownership interest vests. I.R.C. § 83(a) (2008). An available election under § 83(b) is permitted
through which the recipient can accelerate the tax consequences based on the value of the equity
interest on the date of receipt. I.R.C. § 83(b) (2008). As will be discussed below, the election is
indefensible from a tax policy standpoint and thus a discussion of its effects has been reserved
until later. See infra notes 186 - 190 and accompanying text.
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IV. Is the Receipt of a Profits Interest in a Private Equity Fund
Inconsistent with the Current Tax Law? 63
Some have recently questioned the ability to compensate service providers with
a profits interest in a partnership, particularly in the context of private equity
funds, because, in their view, current law fails to tax the return on human capital
at progressive rates. They assert that the treatment of such interests under the
current tax law deviates from the norm for other compensatory transfers of equity
interests in an enterprise. Criticizing the use of compensatory transfers of profits
interests to unfairly minimize their tax burden, they posit an urgent need for
reform. 64
Allegedly, equity fund managers are improperly permitted to take their share of
the enterprise’s profits as “the equity portion of their compensation.” 65
Furthermore, the liberal tax rules for compensating service partners under
Subchapter K create tax planning opportunities which are not available in other
compensatory contexts. These managers, through their willingness to accept
profits, rather than capital, interests in the partnership, benefit from both the
deferral of the payment of tax and the conversion of ordinary income into capital
gain. 66
It is asserted that this “quirk in the tax law allows some of the richest workers in
the country to pay tax on their labor income at a low rate.” 67 Framed in this
fashion, the passions of the public and Congress are aroused. 68 However, by
failing to survey the entirety of the tax consequences to the recipient of a
compensatory transfer of an equity interest in an enterprise, these advocates
mischaracterize the current tax treatment of such transfers. As illustrated above,
63

Some critics assert that their view is almost universally held by the academic community. See
Victor Fleischer,Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds 51 (U of
Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-27, 2007), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=892440: (“[I]t’s worth noting that there is (near) academic consensus on
one issue: the status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership is no longer a tenable
position to take as a matter of sound tax policy.”).
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Vice President elect Biden would likely embrace such advocacy as it reflects his view of a
patriotic duty to pay taxes at the highest rates.
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See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3.
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I return to this point regularly; however, deferral and conversion are central to most
compensatory transfers of equity interests. Mistakenly, critics appear to ignore the risk factor in
their analysis. The fact that the recipient may never receive a return on his labor is discounted
and/or minimized in their analysis.
67

Id.
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Id. For a sample of reactions from the press and Congress, see supra note 6.
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a fuller exploration of the tax consequences during the entirety of the service
provider’s ownership of the equity interest reveals that the tax treatment of a
profits interest is neither unique nor extraordinary.
A fundamental misconception about the current tax law is that the investment of
human capital under the Code generates ordinary income. As illustrated, much
of the return on compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise is
taxed preferentially. In fact, a profits interest in a partnership frequently
generates ordinary income while an equity interest in a corporation, if profitable,
invariably results in preferential capital gain. 69 Thus, the assertion that the
treatment of profits interest is inconsistent with other compensatory transfers of
equity interests is mistaken.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether a compensatory profits interest receives
preferential treatment under current law, an additional issue arises as to whether
the tax treatment of compensatory equity interests overall should be improved. I
return to this topic below.
Some suggest “that reconsideration of the partnership profits puzzle is
overdue,” 70 and advance proposals, albeit narrowly fashioned, for reform.
They arrive at this conclusion even though the issue of the proper taxation of the
receipt of a partnership profits interest has received an inordinate amount of time
and effort over the past 35 years by the courts, the Treasury, the Service, and
numerous commentators. 71 Nevertheless, it is alleged that the evolution of the
law and its consideration by government officials, practitioners, jurists, and
academics has fallen short of the mark.
One of the difficulties with this recent academic commentary is that it fails to
clarify its target. Is its purpose to reform the treatment of compensatory transfers
of all profits interests of any partnership or instead to address the issue only in
the context of private equity firms and the activities of the mega rich? 72 If the
69

In both settings, it is assumed that the enterprise does not distribute cash or property prior to
the disposition of the equity interest.
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Id.
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See Willis et. al., supra note 12 at ch 4. See also supra notes 3-4 (containing academic
commentary on the issue).
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See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2. Compare the author’s statements in his article regarding the
tax treatment of profits interests (see e.g., pages 1, 4, 16, 20, 25, 49, 58, and 59) with those
regarding the tax treatment of private equity firms (see, e.g., pages 1, 3, 6, 8, 17, 26, 35, 49, and
53). See also Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 Tax L. Rev. 89 (2008). The author appears
conflicted in his determination of the ideal scope of reform. Targeting the mega rich creates the
“unsatisfying impression” that these firms are “being punished simply for having too much
money,” (Id. at 117) implying that the scope of such reform should be broad—perhaps applying to
all partnerships. Yet, he also appeals to “the populist goal of preventing the concentration of
wealth” as a rationale for eliminating the possibility of capital gains treatment for profits interests,
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intent is to prevent excessive benefits for the super rich, thereby targeting
investment structures solely on the size of the return, the goal must be
questioned. Changing major structural components of the tax treatment of
partners and partnerships which have been in place for more than 50 years is illadvised if the reason for reform is the profitability of a single industry.
However, if the concern is broader, i.e., the proper theoretical taxation of a
compensatory receipt of a profits interest in a partnership, such concerns arise
with respect to any receipt of a profits interest. Reform, if needed, should be
broadly-based, applicable to all. A fundamental principle of tax policy is
horizontal equity, i.e., similarly-situated individuals should be treated similarly.
The net worth and/or net income of the recipient is irrelevant to the development
of sound tax policy principles. If the current treatment of compensatory profits
interests is inappropriate for private equity firms, it is similarly so for all other
business enterprises, regardless of size.
Most, if not all, of the perceived problem was caused by the death of the Reagan
revolution in the area of taxation. During his presidency and with his leadership,
the Code was reformed by effectively eliminating the rate preference for capital
gains. The disparity in the tax treatment of capital gain and ordinary income is
central to these concerns. 73 The proper taxation of human capital and invested
capital would be a non-issue if preferential treatment for capital gains were
eliminated from the Code. Nevertheless, for purposes of our analysis, one must
assume that the tax preference for capital gain income will continue into the
foreseeable future.
Critics argue that change is long overdue. For example, recent commentary
asserts: “[T]he status quo is untenable as a matter of tax policy.” 74 I argue to the
contrary—the status quo is the second best approach to the issue. Given the
administrative difficulties in disentangling in any meaningful way the return on
human capital and the return on invested capital, the current system is the best
we can do.
The current tax treatment of compensatory transfers of equity interests in
enterprises did not occur by happenstance. Instead the treatment is by
(Id. at 118-19) suggesting that only a few privileged sectors should be reformed. On the one
hand, he decries the Blackstone IPO for having less tax liability as a publicly traded partnership
than it would have as a public corporation (Id. at 96); while, on the other hand, he applauds the
Blackstone IPO for being accessible to the general investing public (Id. at 119).
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See Fleischer, supra note 64, at 96 (“Carried interest distributions are often taxed at the longterm capital gains rate of 15%. Corporations, however, cannot take advantage of the capital gains
preference; corporations pay tax on such gains at a 35% rate. So if Blackstone were treated as a
corporation for tax purposes, it would pay substantially more tax on the compensation it earns for
managing funds.”).
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4.

31

Congressional design. The tax consequences upon the receipt and ownership of
a compensatory profits interest in a partnership are no different than the
consequences of other compensatory transfers of partnership equity interests
and in many cases are worse than the tax treatment of corporate compensatory
transfers. The tax treatment of profits interests is not unique.
Critics have erroneously concluded that the taxation of compensatory profits
interests differs dramatically from the taxation of other compensatory equity
interests. They assert that the adoption of various reform proposals would tax
profits interests “in a manner that more closely matches how our tax system
treats other forms of compensation, thereby improving economic efficiency and
discouraging wasteful regulatory gamesmanship.” 75 However, our current
system for taxing compensatory transfers of equity interests fails to treat the
majority of the return thereon as attributable to the rendition of services, taxed at
progressive rates.
In most corporate cases, after receipt, virtually all of the remaining return on the
investment of human capital receives capital gain treatment. This treatment
holds even though the service provider throughout the life of his relationship with
the enterprise does nothing more than provide services. Neither is this the case
in the partnership context, either with respect to the transfer of compensatory
capital interests or profits interests. In fact, after receipt, in many cases, much of
the return from a profits interest may be characterized as ordinary income,
depending upon the business activities of the partnership.
By limiting their focus to a single industry and by failing to look generally to the
entire field of compensatory transfers of equity interests, they erroneously
suggest that in most settings the return on human capital results in ordinary
income. 76 Furthermore, they mistakenly assert that profits interests in
partnerships receive better tax treatment than that available for other
compensatory transfers of equity in an enterprise.
However, the general treatment of compensatory treatment of equity interests in
an enterprise can be improved. As will be discussed further below, I offer a
modest proposal for reform, which would treat compensatory transfers of equity
interests in a business enterprise consistently and would ensure that the return
on human capital is taxed at ordinary rates at the appropriate time. Current law
75

Id at 2 (abstract).
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See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3 (implying that in most settings the return on human capital
results in ordinary income) and 49 (asserting that profits interests in partnerships receive
preferential tax treatment under current law); Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4 at 4 (return on
human capital should result in ordinary income and profits interests receive preferential tax
treatment under the status quo); Aron-Dine, supra note 20 at 1 (also assuming that returns on
human capital result in ordinary income and assuming preferential tax treatment for profits
interests).
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possesses an elective provision through which recipients of a restricted equity
interest can elect to value it for tax purposes as of the date of receipt, i.e., prior to
vesting. This feature is one of the least defensible aspects of the current tax
treatment of compensatory transfers of equity interests from the standpoint of tax
policy.

V. Private Equity Funds—Organization and Compensatory
Treatment of Fund Managers
The standard package for fund managers of a private equity fund is “two and
twenty.” The managers “take a share of partnership profits as the equity portion
of their compensation.” 77 They typically insist upon a management fee equal to
two percent of the capital contributed to the enterprise by the other investors. 78
The two percent is generally assessed on committed capital, regardless of
whether it has been contributed to date. In addition, the fund manager, as its
“upside potential,” receives a 20 percent interest in the future profits of the
enterprise.
If the fund does well, the manager shares in the bonanza. If unsuccessful, the
manager “can walk away.” 79 Heads I win and tails you lose, the critics would
have us believe. Apparently, in their minds, the possibility of receiving nothing
for one’s time and effort does not differentiate the relationship from other
compensatory settings such as those of a pure employee or the unrestricted
receipt of compensatory equity interests.
The typical private investment fund is organized as a limited partnership or a
limited liability company, the significance of which from a tax standpoint is that it
is treated as a partnership, unless it elects to the contrary, for tax purposes.
Thus, the enterprise and its members are governed by the rules of Subchapter K
for tax purposes. 80 Investors commit capital to the enterprise and a general
partner manages the business for a fee of two percent of the contributed capital
on an annual basis.
Should the life of the partnership extend for seven years, the general partner
would receive 14 percent of the investors’ capital in return for its management
services. With respect to these amounts, the general partner service provider is
77

Id at 3.
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Management fees are taxed as ordinary income. Depending upon the percentage of these
fees compared to the return generated by the profits interests, the imperfection in the current
treatment of private equity firms is not as extreme as alleged.
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See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3.
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I.R.C. §§ 7701 and 761 (2008); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1,-2, & -3 (2008). See generally
Willis et. al., supra note 12, at chs 1 & 3.
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working for the partnership without risk and the return is determined without
regard to entrepreneurial ownership. The return on this expenditure of human
capital is taxed appropriately as ordinary income.
Additionally, the general partner typically puts “skin in the game” by contributing
capital to the partnership similar to that of the investors. The amount varies from
one to five percent of the total contributions to the fund. 81
Subchapter K is intended to afford partners and partnerships flexibility in
structuring their relationships. In contrast to Subchapter C, in which equity
ownership is typically consistent in its overall percentage ownership (dividend
rights, liquidation rights, and dispositional rights) of the enterprise, Subchapter K
openly permits, with various safeguards inapplicable in this context, variations in
the partners’ percentage ownership of rights to capital, profits, and losses of the
partnership. 82
The purpose for transferring the larger interest in profits than capital to the
general partner apparently is reflective of a capitalistic transaction: “Because the
GP can earn significant compensation if the fund performs well, the fund
managers are driven to work harder and earn profits for the partnership as a
whole.” 83 The tax treatment of the disproportionately larger profits interest is
called into question.
After formation of the private equity fund, the contributed capital is utilized for
investment in failing or underperforming enterprises. Using its expertise in
selecting, rehabilitating, and financing the selected enterprises, after a period of
time (typically two to seven years), the value of the underperforming businesses
has either been restored or enhanced or has been determined to be no longer
worth pursuing. In either case, ownership of the enterprises is sold to others at a
gain or a loss.
Under the current tax law, the disposition of the rejuvenated businesses is
determined at the partnership level and typically gives rise to capital gain or
81

See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 8, acknowledging a capital contribution by the general partner:
“The GP also contributes some of its own capital to the fund so that it has some ‘skin in the
game.’” The fund manager makes an outright capital investment and thus has an overall
investment of human capital and invested capital, rather than the targeted transaction involving
exclusively the investment of human capital. Thus, the proffered quintessential example of a
private equity fund deviates from the target of reform, i.e., the mere receipt of a compensatory
profits interest.
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I.R.C. §§ 701-704 (2008). See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch 10. Section 704(b)
imposes safeguards against excessive behavior in the allocations of partnership items by
requiring them to possess substantial economic effect or to be in accord with the partners’
interests in the partnership. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2008).
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 8.
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capital loss. The resuscitated businesses are assets which are not being held for
sale in the ordinary course of the partnership’s trade or business. 84 As a
consequence, gain or loss is characterized as capital in nature.
Under Subchapter K, each partner reports annually his distributive share of the
partnership’s gain or loss as characterized at the partnership level. 85 The partner
is taxed currently even if the profits generated are not distributed to the partner.
Once all of the partnership’s investments have been sold, the fund liquidates and
distributes the remaining cash to the partners.
In the compensatory context, critics misperceive the difference between a profits
interest which is dependent upon uncertain future events and a capital interest
which has liquidation value upon receipt. While acknowledging that, if the fund
performs poorly, the manager can walk away, it is assumed that a compensatory
receipt of a profits interest has current and certain value worthy of current
taxation. However, in the example, the “carry” received by the fund manager has
no liquidation value and is performance based; should the fund perform poorly,
20 percent of zero is zero. Risk and uncertainty exists for both the manager and
the fund’s investors. In fact, the managers of over 30 percent of private equity
funds started between 1991 and 1997 never received a financial return on their
profits interests. 86

VI. The Case Against the Current Tax Treatment of Profits
Interests
It has been alleged that the “tax rules treat partnership profits interests more
favorably than other forms of compensation.” 87 By utilizing the carry component
of the compensatory arrangement, the recipients “defer the tax on income
derived from their human capital.” 88
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IRC § 1221 (2008). See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch 9.
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IRC § 702(b) (2008). See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch 9. Regarding the
legislative history of the provision, see Mary Louise Fellows, Partnership Taxation: Confusion in
Section 702(b), 32 Tax L. Rev. 67 (1976).
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See Staff of the Joint Comm. On Taxation, 110th Cong., Present Law and Analysis Relating to
Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests at 39. An assumption that all, or even most,
partnerships are profitable in any given year is often erroneous. For example, “historically,
partnerships classified in the real estate and rental and leasing sector have dominated the
statistics for both the number of partnerships and partners.” Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Statistics of Income, 9/22/07 Stat. Income 69, available at 2007
WLNR 26139102, para. 17. Yet, “prior to 1994, these partnerships reported total net losses for
most (if not all) years on record.” Id.
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Unfortunately, while arguing for taxation at progressive rates from the investment
of human capital in return for compensatory transfers of equity interests, critics
fail to address and define the circumstances of when human capital has been
invested as well as how much of the return on that investment should be
attributed to human capital rather than invested capital. In contrast to the
discussion presented above illustrating the definitional issues and difficulties in
disentangling returns on human capital from those on invested capital, critics
frequently assume that the entirety of the return from the receipt of a
compensatory equity interest should derive ordinary income treatment. 89
However, such is not the treatment under current law. 90
While questioning the deferral component derived from the receipt of a profits
interest in a partnership, they fail to acknowledge that opportunities for deferral
arise in other compensatory transfers of equity interests. The deferral feature is
present to some extent in virtually all transfers of compensatory interests in
equity. 91
Over and above the preferential treatment of deferral, another criticism of such
compensatory arrangements is that fund managers through their receipt of a
profits interests “often” are able “to convert the character of [their return on labor]
from ordinary income into long-term capital gain,” which is taxed preferentially. 92
This too is a mischaracterization of the current tax law. Many profits interests
generate ordinary income, because those partnerships produce ordinary income
through the conduct of their profit-making activities, e.g., service partnerships,
partnerships operating apartment buildings, restaurants, or movie theaters, etc.
As mandated by § 702(b), the partner’s characterization of his distributive share
of the partnership’s income is dependent upon the business-oriented or profitoriented activity conducted by the partnership. The character of the income is
determined by assessing the activities of the partnership with respect to the
acquisition, retention, and disposition of its assets. If the asset is capital in
nature at the entity level, the activities of the partners are deemed irrelevant.
89

See infra at notes 153-157 and accompanying text. Many base their proposals on the
assumption that these definitional issues do not exist and the human/invested capital distinction is
irrelevant. See Aron-Dine, supra note 20 (favoring ordinary income method with entire amount of
carried interest attributable to compensation for human capital); Cunningham & Engler, supra
note 4 (acknowledging importance of distinction between human capital and invested capital, but
providing no method for disentangling the two and failing to acknowledge that definitional issues
may arise).
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We return later to a discussion of the normative treatment of compensatory receipts and
whether current law requires reform. See infra at notes 155-163 and accompanying text.
91

See supra at notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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That characterization holds for all members of the partnership regardless of the
nature of their involvement with the enterprise.
Thus, partners contributing only invested capital nevertheless may derive
ordinary income and those investing human capital may derive capital gain.
Under current law, the focus is on the entity, not its members. It is the effort of
the enterprise which is determinative of the character of the income and thus at
what rate the income will be taxed. While challenging the ability of the return on
the contribution of human capital to receive preferential treatment, critics do not
insist upon consistent treatment for partners contributing invested capital who
receive ordinary income treatment. 93
The conversion feature exists in every traditional compensatory transfer of an
equity interest in a corporation and potentially exists with respect to every
compensatory transfer of a capital interest in a partnership. 94 Notwithstanding
assertions to the contrary, Congress has purposefully authorized the conversion
feature for most compensatory transfers of equity interests. 95
Such treatment is alleged to deviate from the norm: “This conversion of labor
income into capital gain is contrary to the general approach of the Internal
Revenue Code and diverges from the treatment of other compensatory
instruments. Partnership profits interests are treated more favorably than other
economically similar methods of compensation, such as partnership capital
interests, restricted stock, . . .” 96 However, as illustrated above, this is simply not
the case. The only difference between a compensatory profits interest and a
compensatory capital interest in a partnership is the tax obligation on the date of
receipt. Furthermore, that difference is material as one has received something
with a liquidation value on the date of the grant and the other has not. In every
other respect, the recipients will receive identical treatment throughout the
entirety of their ownership of the interests.
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The concept works both ways and has been legislatively sanctioned. If critics seek a more
accurate determination of the return on human capital and invested capital, then their proposals
should be expanded accordingly.
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If the partnership’s business activity produces exclusively ordinary income and all of its assets
at the time of the service provider’s sale or liquidation of his interest are ordinary income assets,
no conversion will occur. Partnerships in many industries as a whole report predominately
ordinary income, including agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale
trade, transportation and warehousing, information, professional, scientific, and technical
services, and health care. IRS Statistics of Income Division, Fall SOI Bulletin, July 2008.
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See supra at notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4, concluding that a partnership profits interest currently is
“the single most tax-efficient form of compensation available without limitation to highly-paid
executives.”
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The reason for the sole distinction between the two is risk. The recipient of the
capital interest has liquidation value upon receipt, while the profits interest
recipient’s economic enhancement is dependent upon future events as it lacks
current liquidation value. But from that point on, their tax consequences from the
compensatory transfers will be identical. The factor of risk is determinative. 97
Few, if any, can predict the future accurately. Uncertainty and risk are everyday
features of life. Although the country is spiraling into economic crises, critics
imply that these endeavors will invariably prove profitable. 98
With regard to compensatory profits interests, concern is expressed about the
loss of efficiency caused by the presence of compensatory arrangements
motivated by tax considerations, particularly through increased agency costs for
the investors. 99 Why agency costs are increased is not revealed. The investors
appear to pay less, not more, when compensatory profits interests are utilized
because they have no initial compensatory outlay and only “pay” the fund
managers if they are profitable. If the fund does well, the investors share in its
success. If not, the investors minimize the amount of compensation paid to the
managers. Thus, efficiency apparently has been improved and agency costs
decreased by the use of such arrangements.
Critics further allege that this quirk in the tax law favors private investment firms
over investment banks: “This tax advantage for partnerships distorts the decision
as to how to organize new business entities.” 100 In making organizational
decisions, is the compensatory benefit of a profits interest, should it exist, more
important than the single level of taxation for partnerships compared to the
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The possibility that risk could factor in to differing treatment is ignored. See Aron-Dine, supra
note 20; Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4; Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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These assumptions were likely attributable to the economic conditions at the time criticism
against the tax treatment of private equity funds began to mount. During that time, all
investments seemed to appreciate. As the private equity firm Blackstone went public, its fourth
quarter earnings were in excess of $800,000,000. In less than one year, its quarterly earnings in
March 2008 had plummeted to $88,000,000, a decline of 89 percent. Peter Lattman,
Blackstone’s Hope--Do Dark Days Mean Opportunity? Wall Street Journal Mar. 11, 2008, at C3.
Blackstone’s net income (loss) (in thousands) further reveals the genuine risk involved in
receiving a profits interest: 2nd qtr 2008 $(156,531); 1st qtr 2008 $(250,993); 4th qtr 2007
$(170,000); 3rd qtr 2007 $(113,190); 2nd qtr 2007 $774,351; 1st qtr 2007 $1,132,076; 4th qtr
2008 $1,182,440; 3rd qtr 2006 $372,548; 2nd qtr 2006 $224,063; 1st qtr 2006 $487,155. One
can only imagine what the bottom line results will be in the third and fourth quarter of 2008.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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Id at 5.
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double level for corporations? 101 If so, why are these enterprises not shifting to
partnership form, rather than remaining in corporate solution? 102
The conversion and deferral features of a profits interest in a partnership also are
indicted as violating sound tax policy. However, not every profits interest, even if
profitable, produces preferentially taxed capital gain. Many produce ordinary
income. 103 Of greater importance, as illustrated above, conversion and deferral
attributes exist in the other four types of compensatory transfers of an equity
interest in an enterprise.
Finally, concerns over this preferential tax treatment and distributive justice have
been raised. Allegedly, this societal goal is undercut by the preferential tax
treatment of the return on partnership profits interests. 104
The proponents of change agree that important factors must be taken into
account in determining the appropriate tax treatment of compensatory receipts of
101

However, additional concerns are confronted in making organizational decisions. See Victor
Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 Tax L. Rev. 89 (2008) (admitting that non-tax issues are
reflected in organizational structure as well and identifying a number of those factors).
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Between 1995 and 2005, the total number of new partnerships organized in the United States
increased at a rate of only 5.7 percent (including both new entities and entities shifting from
corporate to partnership classification). Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Statistics of Income, 9/22/07 Stat. Income 69, available at 2007 WLNR 26139102.
If choice of entity were so influenced by this “quirk” in the tax law, one would expect this number
to be much larger.
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On this point, such a narrow focus leads to a faulty assessment: “under current law, if the
compensation is paid in the form of a profits interest, we estimate the return on human capital
portion at zero and treat the entire amount, if and when it is received, as a return on investment
capital.” Fleischer, supra note 2, at 41. However, many profits interests generate ordinary
income for their recipients. Ninety-nine percent of the return from the profits interest of every
lawyer who is a partner in a law firm is ordinary income. The profits interest of a partnership turns
on the income generated by the partnership and under § 702(b) is characterized at the
partnership level. I.R.C. § 702(b) (2008). Thus, the concern is narrower than implied.
104

Some assert that the number of fund managers earning over $100,000,000 exceeded the
number CEOs similarly situated at a nine to one ratio. Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5-6.
Unfortunately, the comparison is not of comparables as it is limited to reported income. The
income from a profits interest is reported annually. However, CEOs with their corporate stock are
taxed on salary, dividends, and/or stock received currently, but not on its appreciation in value.
The author “compliments” the “much maligned” CEOs because they pay tax at 35 percent on
most of their income in contrast to managers who inappropriately limit their civic contribution to a
mere 15 percent. However, even this assertion may be erroneous, because CEO’s reported
income from their corporation may include dividends and gain from the disposition of their stock,
both of which are taxed at 15 percent. For a discussion of executive compensation disclosure,
see Eric Dash, Executive Pay: A Special Report – More Pieces, Still a Puzzle, New York Times,
Apr. 8, 2007 (finding even the bottom line compensation amount – meant to be an easy way of
evaluating executive compensation -- to be misleading due to the numerous ways of calculating
such figure).
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equity interests, such as influencing entrepreneurial risk taking, complexity, and
inefficiency generated through excessive tax planning. 105 Nevertheless,
numerous proposals have been advanced, including “a rule treating all carried
interest distributions as ordinary income” which has been embraced as “probably
the most appealing policy option.” 106 This normative proposal will be discussed
below under proposals for reform. 107

VII. Criticism of Current Tax Treatment of Compensatory
Transfer of Profits Interests
Congress adopted specific tax treatment for the compensatory transfer of an
equity interest in an enterprise which recognizes the uncertainty and tension
between human capital and invested capital on the return from its receipt. The
governing compromise selected by Congress is ordinary income on the receipt of
the interest and possible capital gain on its disposition. In effect, current law
recognizes that a return on human capital, if not withdrawn from the enterprise,
may be conceptualized as a re-investment/conversion of human capital into
invested capital. Thereafter, the future services are considered a de minimis
adjunct to the invested capital and future growth is entitled, in certain
circumstances, to preferential tax treatment.
The putative contribution thereby ends the period for measuring the return on
human capital and begins the period of return on invested capital. 108 Even
though the service provider continues to render services without additional
compensation, Congress has concluded that this is the appropriate point in time
at which to cease treating the tax consequences of the receipt as attributable to
human capital.
Regarding partnerships, an additional component, absent in the corporate
context, in the characterization of the return on the expenditure of human capital
is the income derived by the enterprise on an annual basis. During the
operational phase, § 702(b) mandates that the income of the partnership which is
passed through to its partners is characterized at the partnership level. Utilizing
an entity approach, Congress concluded that the efforts of the enterprise, the
vehicle though which the members conduct their profit-oriented activities, should
be the focal point in the determination of whether any of its activities qualify for
preferential tax treatment. A partnership producing capital gain is effectuating
105
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
See infra at notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
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Differences exist between the corporate treatment and the partnership treatment. See supra
at notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
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the tax policy behavior which Congress seeks to encourage. The reward for
such endeavors is a tax rate of 15 percent rather than 35 percent.
In addressing the current state of the law, critics typically begin with the
erroneous assumption that any return on human capital must be ordinary
income. 109 As illustrated above, this is not the case. They then turn their
attention to the current tax treatment of carried interests. 110
As recognized by the Service and the Treasury, a profits interest is not taxable
upon receipt given the absence of liquidation value. However, some suggest that
this cannot be the case even while acknowledging that there is no certainty of
success: “This treatment seems counter-intuitive. The [general partner] receives
something of value at the moment the partnership agreement is signed.” 111
In fact, the treatment of profits interests comports with the Code’s treatment for
compensatory transfers of restricted equity interests in a business enterprise
under § 83. In those cases, value is certain but subject to conditions which are a
prerequisite to vesting. If the determinative factor for tax purposes is merely that
something of value has been received, this is clearly a stronger case for taxation
upon receipt than that of a profits interest. The former requires the passage of
time while rendering services. The latter requires both the passage of time and
the derivation of income by the enterprise. 112 Yet, it is without question that
restricted interests are not subject to tax currently, unless the taxpayer makes an
affirmative election to do so under § 83(b).
In assessing how profits interests should be taxed, the unique features of a
compensatory profits interest are ignored, i.e., its use as an incentive in order to
receive the services of a particular individual. This is the sine qua non of the
109

The failure to specifically define what constitutes a return on human capital clouds the issue,
but it is assumed that, if the receipt of the equity interest is for services, all subsequent economic
enhancement is attributable to human capital and should be taxed as ordinary income. See
Fleischer, supra note 2, at 27-32 (characterizing subsequent economic enhancement as
“unrealized human capital” which should be taxed at ordinary rates) and Gergen, supra note 3, at
94 (“if a partner performs services for a profits interest, and profits later are allocated to her in the
form of earned income or an increase in her capital account to credit her with a share of
unrealized gain, that allocation or increase should be treated as ordinary income. . . .”).
110

See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 9-16.
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Id at 10 to be contrasted with an earlier statement that if “the fund does badly; however, the
manager can walk away.” Id at 3.
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The importance of risk in determining the proper tax treatment for such compensatory
receipts is minimized in such advocacy. For example, some assert: “On the one hand, a carried
interest is a valuable piece of property that often turns out to be worth millions and even hundreds
of millions of dollars.” (Emphasis added) Id at 10. Nevertheless, after assuring the reader of its
certainty of worth, it is subsequently noted that “the amount of carry is uncertain and
unpredictable.” Id at 12.
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grant. The services of another, or any transferee of the service provider, would
not suffice. The vast majority of the population would lack the requisite expertise.
Even those with the expertise may lack work habits, personality, and other
intangibles, which likely were the reasons the enterprise did not approach him or
her, rather than the service provider, with the same offer.
As a consequence, a profits interest in a partnership is effectively nontransferable, because its grant is tied exclusively to the efforts of its holder who
possesses the requisite expertise sought by the enterprise. If one could find a
third party willing to purchase the interest, he or she would purchase nothing of
value. 113 Without the service provider’s continued rendition of entrepreneurial
skill, the partnership is most unlikely to permit a third party lacking such skills to
acquire the interest of the service provider and share in the future profits of the
enterprise. Thus, the interest of the service provider in essence is a restricted
interest for which the attendant conditions are satisfied on a daily/yearly basis
and, as met, the income attributable thereto is “received.”
A frequently employed compensatory technique utilized in the corporate arena is
restricted stock. In such a case, § 83 puts the service provider to a choice. The
recipient can wait until the stock is vested and treat the value of the stock at that
time as ordinary income. Alternatively, the recipient can include it in ordinary
income at its current value (without concern for most restrictions), receive a basis
for tax purposes in the stock of an equivalent amount, avoid further tax
consequence upon vesting, and treat all future appreciation as preferential
capital gain. 114
From the recipient’s standpoint, conceptualizing the election as one of choice is
difficult. The well-informed service provider, almost without exception, will make
the election due to the “superior skills” which he or she brings to the
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Some might assert that the interest of the service provider after two years of service, if his
annual profits have not been withdrawn, would have liquidation value. While true, as discussed
below, that is because his or her past profits interest annually converts to a capital interest. See
supra at notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Furthermore, because he or she has taken the
income into account annually, the basis for the partnership interest has increased accordingly,
and the sale of those rights would have value.
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By way of example, assume that Charlotte in the above example receives her stock in
Corporation C, but is subject to a four-year vesting period. Without the § 83(b) election, she will
have no tax consequences in Year 1. When the stock vests in Year 4, assuming the value of the
stock has appreciated from $500,000 to $2,084,000, she will have $2,084,000 of ordinary income
and a basis of her stock of $2,084,000. If she sold her stock in Year 5 for $4,000,000, she would
recognize the $1,916,000 gain as capital in character and pay tax at the preferential rate. With
the election, she would have $500,000 of ordinary income, a basis for her stock of $500,000 in
Year 1, and no tax consequences in Year 4. In Year 5, she would have capital gain in the
amount of $3,500,000.
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compensatory relationship. 115 In light of the restrictions and uncertainty attending
the vesting of the stock, the recipient would insist upon cash or find other
employment if there was substantial uncertainty in his or her mind as to its
prospects for appreciation. 116
Surprisingly, critics in an effort to ensure that the return on human capital is taxed
at ordinary income rates ignore this elective tax treatment which flies in the face
of their goal. If reforms are necessary to ensure that the return on human capital
is taxed as ordinary income, then tax consequences should arise only upon the
vesting of the restricted equity interests. In fact, some reform proposals
perpetuate this distortion by offering an election to the taxpayer as to the date of
income inclusion, which by definition produces different results depending upon
which of the two options is chosen by the taxpayer. 117

115

I am not saying that the service provider’s assumptions will prove accurate. Instead, I am
asserting that, given human behavior, the recipient in accepting stock conditioned upon the
rendition of future services for a fixed period of time has clearly decided, upon the acceptance of
the offer, that the endeavor will prove profitable.
Importantly, a full understanding of how the tax law treats such compensatory arrangements
under the elective feature requires the consideration of what happens if loss rather than gain
arises notwithstanding the best efforts of the service provider. Assuming that the stock plummets
in value to $100,000 in Year 4 and $50,000 in Year 5, without the election, the executive has
ordinary income of $100,000 in Year 4 and a basis of $100,000. Upon its sale in Year 5, he or
she would have a $50,000 capital loss, which is of little value to a taxpayer. With the election, the
executive has $500,000 of ordinary income in Year 1, a basis for the stock of an equivalent
amount, no further tax in Year 4, and a $450,000 capital loss in Year 5.
To exhaust the logical possibilities, the results produced under § 83 in case of forfeiture must be
addressed. Without the election, assuming the executive decides to take new employment in
Year 3, no tax consequences would ensue and Charlotte would be left to ponder the wisdom of
her ever having agreed to receive restricted stock as her compensatory stake in the enterprise.
With the election, she would have $500,000 of ordinary income in Year 1. Even though she
would receive a basis in the stock of $500,000, § 83 prohibits a corresponding loss, even one
characterized as capital, upon her forfeiture.
116

Although a lack of hard data exists, by intuition it can be expected that service providers of
new partnerships, or of partnerships embarking upon a new and hopefully profitable venture, will
always believe in the future profitability of the enterprise as a result of their added expertise and
will want to take advantage of the relative low initial value of their interest through a §83(b)
election. See David A. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax-Advantaged? 84 B.U.L. Rev. 695,
n.55 (2004) (“start-up company employees generally make the 83(b) election.") (citing E-mail
from Ted R. Buyniski, Buck Consultants, to David I. Walker, Associate Professor, Boston
University School of Law (Mar. 26, 2003). See also Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election
for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective, 59 SMU L. Rev. 721, 726-27 (2006) (“early stage
start-up companies often sell shares to key employees at a nominal value, which can be argued
to be the fair market value of the stock in the fledgling venture. Thus, employees of start-ups can
make an 83(b) election and incur little or no current tax, and they generally do.")
117

See infra at notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
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If taxpayers are to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, they should not be
empowered with the right to make such a determination. Sound tax policy
principles dictate a fixed date and method for determination of the return on
human capital. Of one thing we can be certain; an election by the taxpayer
cannot be the proper measure. 118
Partnership equity is divided into two categories—capital interests and profits
interests. Critics mistakenly consider the two compensatory devices to be
separate and distinct and thus mutually exclusive. As noted above, the exact
opposite is the case. 119 Profits interests become capital interests and capital
interests are accompanied by profits interests. But for the year of receipt, the tax
consequences to either holder are identical over the life of the equity interest.
There is a symbiotic relationship between a profits interest and a capital interest
which can be elusive. For example, some have stated that the “tax law provides
a timing benefit for GPs by allowing deferral on their compensation so long as the
compensation is structured as a profits interest and not a capital interest in the
partnership.” 120 This is not the case. Compensatory capital interests in a
partnership can be restricted and thereby provide deferral as well under § 83.
Additionally, the recipient of an unrestricted capital interest is not currently
taxable on future profits, even if relatively certain, due to the use of liquidation
value in determining the amount of income to be included upon receipt. Thus,
the deferral benefit for profits interests is not as exceptional as others assert.
Regarding the ability of the compensatory receipt to convert the character of the
service provider’s return on human capital from ordinary to preferentially treated
capital gain, some lament the unfairness of it all: the equity “kicker is treated as
investment income, not labor income, and is taxed at a lower rate than labor
income.” 121 The implication is that such treatment is unique to partnership profits
interests. 122
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I will return to this issue. See infra at notes 192-194 and accompanying text. However, the
willingness to accept such treatment prevents some from discovering a more significant
improvement for the taxation of human capital, i.e., the repeal of § 83(b). This “quirk” is a far
better target for reform than the current tax treatment of partnership profits interests.
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See supra at notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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Id at 13.
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Id at 15.
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Importantly, the mission of my response is to focus on both of the issues raised by the critics.
The first is whether partnership profits interests under the current tax law are treated differently
than other receipts. On this issue, they are in error. However, the second issue, which is
whether the current treatment is sound from a tax policy standpoint and whether it can be
improved, is discussed in detail below. See infra at notes 136- 190 and accompanying text.
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Again, such is not the case. As has been fully documented above, conversion is
not peculiar to partnership profits interests. 123 Instead it permeates the treatment
of compensatory receipts of virtually all equity transfers of interests in
corporations and partnerships.

VIII. The Issue of the Tax Treatment of Compensatory Transfers
of Profits Interests Requires Renewed Scrutiny
Spurred by the extraordinary profitability of private equity firms, some have
suggestedted that there is an urgent need for a re-consideration of the
appropriate tax treatment of the compensatory receipt of a profits interest 124
Based upon their assertion that the current treatment of a compensatory receipt
of a profits interest is unique, providing inappropriate tax consequences, such a
showing alone would warrant a re-examination of the area.
Other developments and reasons are advanced justifying a re-examination of the
area. Acknowledging that the issue of the tax treatment of such compensatory
receipts has become fairly well settled over the past 35 years, some inquire:
“Why reopen the debate?” 125
Without empirical evidence, it is suggested that the use of compensatory profits
interests has increased and their increased usage justifies a re-evaluation: “the
increased use of partnership profits as a method of executive compensation in
the context of private investment funds suggests the need for reform.” 126 With
regard to private equity firms, it is argued that changing sources of capital and
the concern of economic efficiency require a re-examination of the tax treatment
for profits interests. The type of investor participating in private equity funds has
migrated from individuals to institutional investors such as pension funds and
university endowments, due to the increased use of intermediaries and the
development of new investment strategies.
However, the mere growth of a particular industry by itself should not impact the
structure of partnership taxation. 127 Something more should be required.
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See supra at notes 42–70 and accompanying text.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 16-27.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 16. One wonders what the fate of any tax proposal will be after the
economic meltdown of October, 2008. The evolution of the tax law over the next two years is
probably more uncertain than it has been in the last 50 years.
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Id at 16-17.
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At some level, given the existence of partnerships and the use of profits interests through
which to compensate service providers, it is hard to imagine that private equity firms did not use
them previously. The more likely explanation is the size of the amounts generated by their use
increased dramatically.
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Centering on tax policy concerns, concern is expressed that different tax
treatment is given to recipients of profits interests than the recipients of other
compensatory equity interests: “Economically similar transactions are taxed
differently.” 128 While disparate treatment for similar transactions offends sound
tax policy, two factors are overlooked. Of primary concern, the recipient in other
compensatory transfers of equity interests has something of value at the moment
of receipt. The receipt of a profits interest, surrounded by uncertainty and lack of
value, is not similar to the receipt of corporate stock or a partnership capital
interest, both of which possess liquidation value and marketability.
The second mistake in such advocacy is that the overall tax treatment of a
compensatory transfer of a partnership capital interest is identical to the overall
treatment of a profits interest except for the year of receipt. Differences exist in
the year of receipt and hence the reason for different tax treatment of the receipt.
However, once received, the equity interests, both annually and upon liquidation
or sale, are treated identically for tax purposes.
Proceeding with a faulty premise, some maintain that this purported tax
advantage distorts investment behavior. The market is tax sensitive and moves
accordingly, thereby resulting in “deadweight loss” and increased use of private,
rather than public, markets. 129 Section 83 is “the cornerstone of tax policy
regarding executive compensation” and it requires that “property received in
exchange for services be taxed as ordinary income.” 130 While deferral is
This populist rhetoric has resonated with Congress. In the last year, two types of reform bills
have been introduced. One type of reform is industry specific, addressing the Blackstones of the
world which went public. In response, the proposals deny the exception to corporate status under
§ 7704(c) for certain private equity funds. As they would be taxed as corporations under the
proposed legislation, profits interests, specific to partnerships, would no longer be available for
publicly traded private equity firms. See Baucus-Grassley Bill, S. 1624 (110th Cong. 1st Sess),
introduced by Senator Baucus on June 14, 2007.
The other type of reform goes to the heart of the inquiry. Under those bills, returns on certain
profits interests for many partnerships would be required to be treated as ordinary income. See
the Levin Proposal, H.R. 2834 (110th Cong., 1st Sess), introduced by Representative Sander
Levin on June 22, 2007.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 24.
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Id.
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Id at 25. Advocates fail to recognize that, with the election of § 83(b), the recipients of
restricted equity interests are permitted to more closely approximate the taxation of partnership
profits interests even though the recipient has something of greater value and certainty than does
the holder of a profits interest. The election under § 83(b) undercuts the goal of maximizing the
amount of the return from the expenditure of human capital which is taxed at progressive rates. If
anything, § 83(b) virtually eliminates the difference in tax treatment between a profits interest and
a restricted capital interest in the same partnership with an equivalent percentage interest in
profits and losses
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permitted for difficult to value receipts; conversion, i.e., ordinary income into
capital gain, is not and violates the principles of sound tax policy. Because the
“treatment of partnership profits interests departs from this basic framework,” 131 it
is time for change.
However, both assertions are erroneous. 132 First, § 83 does not require that the
entire return on property received for services be taxed as ordinary income. As
previously illustrated, only the front end of the transaction (the value upon receipt
if unrestricted or the value upon vesting if restricted) is treated as ordinary
income. The rest is entitled to capital gain treatment in the corporate context. 133
Opportunities for conversion are possible, but more limited, for partnerships.
Furthermore, the § 83(b) election permits the taxpayer to further limit his ordinary
income at a revenue cost to the Treasury by electing to value the interest on the
day of receipt, even though no services have been rendered. 134 Thus, the return
on human capital is not treated as ordinary income. 135 The election under
§ 83(b) undercuts their goal of maximizing the amount of the return from human
capital which is taxed at progressive rates. If anything, § 83(b) permits the
recipients of restricted equity interests to more closely approximate the taxation
of partnership profits interests even though the recipient has something of
greater value and certainty than does the holder of a profits interest.

IX. The Normative Treatment of the Taxation of Human Capital
Upon the Receipt of Compensatory Transfers of Equity Interests
in an Enterprise
131

Id.
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See supra at notes 110-112 and accompanying text.

133

See supra at notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
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See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57
Tax L. Rev. 137, 168 (2003) (“The C corp structure allows employees to recognize much of this
amount as capital gain through 83(b), which allows employees to elect to lock in the ordinary
income amount at the initial valuation of the property, ensuring that any future appreciation is
treated as capital gain. . . . Because of the liquidation preference attached to the preferred stock,
entrepreneurs use a low valuation for the common stock when it is first received and make the
83(b) election, which ensures capital gain treatment on the subsequent sale of the stock. This
result generally can be replicated in the pass-through structure with some additional planning.”)
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Furthermore, deferral under § 83 does not turn on the difficulty of valuation; instead, it is the
uncertainty of receipt. Deferral is available under § 83 for receipts which are certain and precise.
I.R.C. § 83(a) (2008) (the receipt of property in exchange for services “shall be included in the
gross income of the person who performed such services in the first taxable year in which the
rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.”).
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In their quest to improve the tax law, critics isolate transfers of a profits interest in
a partnership in return for the rendition of services. In their mind, this treatment
is inconsistent with the treatment of other compensatory transfers of equity
interests. Accordingly, they urge reform in this narrow context. 136
Nevertheless, unwittingly they have called into question a serious issue of tax
policy regarding the proper treatment of all such transfers. Five such transfers
are possible in the context of an enterprise. 137 Even if the treatment of a profits
interest is consistent with the treatment of other compensatory transfers, it does
not mean that the field as a whole is not in need of improvement. Thus,
proposals for improvement should be considered in a broader context.
Regardless of the current state of the law, how should the law treat such
transfers as a whole? Most commentators isolate two issues (deferral and
conversion) regarding the tax treatment of compensatory transfers of equity
interests in an enterprise—when should the receipt on human capital be taken
into account and what character should it be given for tax purposes?

A. Deferral
There appears to be broad agreement among tax policy theorists for deferring
the tax consequences on certain transfers of compensatory equity interests.
First, as a society, we are reluctant to tax “endowment” and/or unrealized human
capital. 138 Second, tax policy supports the joining together of labor and capital.
Finally, measurement and valuation issues in some settings warrant a
postponement of taxation. 139 A fourth factor, frequently overlooked, arises with
regard to partnerships, i.e., without postponement, the recipient would
“technically” be double taxed on the same income—once as valued upon receipt
of the profits interest and again as earned. In order to prevent such a possibility,
additional remedial features would be needed in the Code, with a possible
increase in overall complexity.
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This premise is faulty. As documented above, the treatment is far more consistent than
asserted. If the only reason for change is the conclusion that its treatment deviates from the
treatment of other receipts, they are mistaken and the status quo should be maintained.
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Transfers of a capital interest in a partnership, a restricted capital interest therein, a profits
interest, stock in a corporation, and restricted stock in a corporation are the traditional types of
transfers of enterprise equity.
138

For more on endowment taxation, see Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 Duke L.J.
1145, 1146 (2006).
139

Some assert that deferral is questionable for a profits interest because they “have enormous
economic value,” even while noting that such interests are incapable of valuation and, if the
enterprise is not profitable, the holder will receive nothing. Fleischer, supra note 2, at 27 and 12.
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Regarding the five traditional types of equity interests which can be transferred in
return for the service provider’s investment of human capital, three should qualify
for deferral and two should not. The receipt of an unrestricted interest in
corporate stock or an unrestricted capital interest in a partnership should not
qualify for deferral. Consistent with the overall treatment of the current tax
system for the determination of gross income, the requisites of realization and
dominion and control should be determinative for normative purposes. In both
cases, property rights of value without restrictions have been received and few, if
any, would suggest to the contrary. Realization should take place on the receipt
of cash or property.
With respect to the other three types of receipts, a restricted interest in corporate
stock, a restricted interest in partnership capital, and a profits interest in a
partnership, deferral is warranted. Difficulty in measurement and valuation are
controlling factors justifying deferral. 140 However, for normative standards, the
determinative factor should be certainty of ownership; valuation issues should be
irrelevant. All three of these equity interests are subject to forfeiture. 141 Without
the certainty of permanent uninterrupted ownership, deferral is the preferred
approach. It coincides with actual economic enhancement and is dependent
upon certainty of ownership and valuation once the contingencies have been
satisfied. 142
Some have suggested that an annual accrual of a return on human capital would
be preferable to deferral. 143 However, they fail to extend a similar approach to a
restricted capital interest in a partnership or restricted corporate stock. Under
140

See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 27; Gergen, supra note 3, at 102; Aron-Dine, supra note
20, at 10.
141

Most commentators fail to recognize the inherent restrictions on the ability to transfer a profits
interest. If not explicit, certainly implicit in the grant is the continued service to the partnership by
the recipient service provider. Should the service provider decide to exit the partnership, almost
without question, profits derived by the partnership thereafter would be reallocated to the other
partners. Furthermore, no one would pay more than a de minimis sum to purchase the profits
interest for the same reason. Thus, the strongest argument in favor of deferral under current law
for a profits interest is that it is functionally indistinguishable from restricted stock or a restricted
capital interest.
142

The valuation of a profits interest looks to liquidation value, typically resulting in a
determination that value is lacking, while restricted stock is valued on a broader basis.
Accordingly, some view this treatment as objectionable. While greater value may be attributed to
the stock initially, no additional income other than upon disposition of the stock will be incurred by
the recipient. With regard to the holder of a profits interest, tax consequences (and its attendant
tax liability) will arise annually. Accordingly, any additional valuation upon receipt would result in
over taxation on the front end of the ownership which would be offset later by corresponding
losses. Because these future returns will be taken into account, there is no reason from a policy
standpoint to ascribe a future value to them.
143

Fleischer, supra note 2, at 39-43. For an alternate method of annual accrual, see generally
Cunningham & Engler, supra note 3.
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any circumstances, it is difficult to accrue an indeterminate amount which is
dependent upon future events.
While the use of a surrogate for measuring the return on human capital is a
possibility, it conflicts with a strong tax-policy interest in precision and accuracy.
Any accrual approach involves an element of guesswork. Deferral alone does
not compromise these goals. Instead, it effectuates them by awaiting events
which document one’s economic enhancement. Finally, deferral may even
increase the amount of ordinary income from the return on human capital. If the
surrogate produces a figure which is less than the value of the interests once
vested, some of the return on human capital avoids ordinary income
treatment. 144
Critics address only the deferral aspects of the receipt of an equity interest, not
those of the retention and the disposition of the interest. Deferral of tax
consequences during the retention phase for operational income attributable to
the equity interest until its sale or liquidation appears uncontroversial.
Measurement is certain, economic enhancement is sure, and all are premised
upon the concept of realization, upon which most income inclusions in our tax
system are based. Given the fundamental differences between partnerships and
corporations, the deferral period for the recipient of a partnership interest during
the retention period is typically shorter than that for corporations because each
partner must report his share of profits annually.
While granting that the soundest explanation for deferral is the inability to
measure the recipient’s income, either on a cash method basis or an accrual
method basis, some nevertheless advance a proxy for its determination to be
imputed to the service provider on an annual basis. A “cost-of-capital method” is
proposed, under which an annual accrual of ordinary income would occur in the
amount of a selected interest rate times the service provider’s percentage
interest in profits times the capital of the enterprise which he or she manages. 145
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Similarly, the possibility arises of over-reporting the amount of return on human capital if the
surrogate imposition over the vesting period exceeds the value of the interest on the date that the
conditions are fulfilled.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 39-43. By way of example, assume that a private equity fund
begins with $100,000,000 of capital. Under the approach, the service provider receiving a 20
percent profits interest would annually take $1,600,000 (8% x 20% x $100,000,000) into ordinary
income. As a consequence, the proposal eliminates the benefit of deferral by proxy which is
“imperfect. . .and is likely to undervalue the true amount of the increase in value of partnership
assets that reflects a return on human capital, but it is undoubtedly more economically accurate
than current law, which estimates this amount at zero.” Id at 42.
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Problematically, such an approach involves guesswork and over- or underinclusion of the amount of income constituting ordinary income. 146 Additionally,
the proposal applies only to the receipt of a profits interest without extension to
the other two types of equity receipts entitled to deferral. From a normative
standpoint, if producing meaningful reform, critics should subject similar
compensatory transfers of equity interests to the same treatment.
Comparable settings in which the general rules of realization are overridden for
service providers are absent from the Code. Why in this case are proxies
required and not in others? Pure capital appreciation arising from an investment
in stock on a public market, while certain in value and susceptible of an annual
determination, is not subject to tax on an annual basis. The tax system fails to
intervene because administrative ease and certainty are fostered by embracing
the doctrine of realization. A determination of the return on human capital at the
time of receipt and realization is the superior method for disentangling the
amounts attributable to human capital and those to invested capital. 147
The cost of capital proposal adopts an approach similar to the statutory solution
to the tax treatment of interest free loans under § 7872. 148 Thereunder, the
income imputed to the service provider attributable to the interest-free
component is accompanied by an imputed payment from the recipient to the
party advancing the funds. Thus, a question arises as to whether the overall
effect of both transactions currently or ultimately offset. If so, the imputed income
and the corresponding deduction effectively cancel each other out. 149 If
premised under the operation of § 7872, they should, in which case the proposal
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But see § 7872 regarding interest free loans which utilizes a surrogate. However, in those
settings, without a surrogate, tax consequences would be avoided. Such is not the case for
compensatory transfers of an equity interest in an enterprise.
147

See infra at notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
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Fleischer, supra note 2, at 41. Such a proposal strays from the foundational principles of
Subchapter K by suggesting that an annual measurement of return is not possible for a profits
interest. Conflating the concept with the experience a particular industry, assertions are
advanced which are true in only a small number of cases: “We cannot measure the returns on
human capital directly; under current law, if the compensation is paid in the form of a profits
interest, we estimate the return on human capital portion at zero and treat the entire amount, if
and when it is received, as a return on investment capital.” Id. However, most profits interests
function in exactly the opposite way. Profits are derived annually and flow through to the service
provider. Secondly, this advocacy undercuts the need for a proxy because of the uncertainty of
receipt (“if and when it is received”). Id. A proxy to accelerate something which may never occur
should strike one as extreme and would add additional complexity in unraveling the imputation
should the actual income not equal the imputed proxy amount.
149

Some disagreement exists as to whether such a deduction should be allowed. See supra note
27.
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accomplishes little from a deferral standpoint because the imputed income is
offset either currently or sometime in the future by a corresponding deduction. 150
Finally, from a normative perspective, if deferral is appropriate for restricted
equity interests, should a recipient be able to accelerate his or her tax
consequences without meaningfully restructuring the compensatory relationship?
Obviously, an acceleration of tax consequences would ensue if the parties
agreed to eliminate the conditions which must be fulfilled prior to a vesting of
ownership.
Under current law, the use of the § 83(b) election permits the recipient of a
restricted entrepreneurial interest to cap the amount of ordinary income in the
year of receipt. The increase in the value of the stock or the capital interest
through the rendition of services over the mandated period of service is deferred
until the sale or liquidation of the interest. The best approach on the issue of
deferral is to tax the service provider on his or her receipt of an equity interest on
the date of realization only. Any system permitting a choice by the service
provider of some other date undercuts consistency in the treatment of equally
situated persons and deviates from the policy rationale that income inclusion
should be tied to a realization event.
Deferral’s impact on the determination of the proper return on human capital has
been lamented by some: “In sum, in circumstances where a partnership’s
income is deferred by reason of the realization doctrine, current law allows
deferral of returns on human capital.” 151 The difficultly with this analysis is that
such treatment is the essence of the realization doctrine. Instead of guesswork
and subsequent offsetting adjustments to the extent the initial estimate fails to be
accurate, the law adopts a wait-and-see approach in order to ensure certainty
and minimize complexity. 152 Additionally, deferral extends to any restricted
equity interest, not merely to compensatory interests in partnership profits.

B. Conversion
Regardless of the various tax policy concerns and principles, the heart of the
target is the possible conversion feature of a compensatory transfer of a
partnership profits interest. Many of the tax reform proposals turn on the need to
ensure that ordinary income is attributed to some portion of the return from the
150

If such an approach were adopted, it would require further integration with the tax treatment of
the actual profits generated annually. Would the annual imputation absorb, to the extent thereof,
any actual profits for the year? How would overages be treated? What if lesser amounts were
forthcoming?
151

Id at 43.
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Some vacillate in selecting their target for reform by asserting that “current law works well in
most contexts outside of investment partnerships.” Id at 43.
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profits interest. If the expenditure of human capital is to be taxed properly, i.e., at
ordinary income rates, the “quirk” in the current law which permits a return on
human capital to be taxed at the preferential capital gain rate must be remedied,
not merely for profits interest but for all compensatory equity transfers. 153
Advocates assert that most “tax scholars agree that we ought to tax labor income
progressively so that the average tax rate rises with income.” 154 While the
general proposition is technically correct, the assertion glosses over the
important definitional issue of what constitutes a return on human capital and
when, if at all, such a return, if left in the enterprise and not withdrawn, converts
to invested capital. 155
Without explanation, critics appear to assume that if a profits interest is received
for the rendition of services, ordinary income taxed at the progressive rates is
appropriate for the entirety of the return. 156 However, given the absence of
criticism of the other four types of compensatory transfers of equity interests and
the conversion feature attributable thereto, the status quo for those receipts goes
unchallenged. If so, what separates the return from human capital for the other
four from that for a profits interest?
The range of possibilities for selection of the normative standard for determining
the return on human capital is vast and the alternatives numerous. One
approach is a characterization from the front-end of the transaction, i.e., if the
equity interest was received for services, any and all financial return over the life
of the interest is taxable as ordinary income. Everything constitutes a return on
human capital, even upon a disposition of the interest. 157 Any and all returns are
ordinary income because the totality of the recipient’s “contribution” to the
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Surprisingly, while advocating a tracing approach in which ordinary income will be taken into
account, some nevertheless propose a taxpayer election under which deferral or conversion is
possible, but not both. See infra at notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
154

Fleischer, supra note 2, at 43. This appears to be the cornerstone of most, if not all,
justifications for the proposals for change. See, e.g., Aron-Dine, supra note 20, at 2-3; Statement
of Senator Max Baucus, July 11. 2005, para. 3-5; Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4, at 4.
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Some mistakenly assume that most, if not all, profits interests permit conversion. See The
Levin Proposal, supra note 20; Aron-Dine, supra note 20. Such is not the case to the lament of
numerous doctors, lawyers, and accountants throughout the country. See supra note 94 for a
sample of business sectors in which partnerships report predominately ordinary income.
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While they only address profits interests and the return from human capital, under their view,
the other four types of equity interests should be treated similarly.
157

The application of the rule in the partnership context is more difficult given the conduit
approach of the Code.

53

enterprise was the rendition of services. 158 The parties transacted for the
rendition of services, and thus any return derives from human capital.
Under this analysis, the relationship of the service provider to the enterprise is
reminiscent of the relationship between an employee and an employer and thus,
deserves similar treatment. 159 Of course a major difference is that the service
provider is foregoing direct payment and, unlike the employee, possesses an
ownership interest in the enterprise, with the inherent risk that attaches to the
marketplace.
The difficulty with such an approach is that it ignores other factors in the market
place. The future appreciation of an enterprise may be attributable to any
combination of three factors—profitability due to the conduct of the business,
inflation, and appreciation in the value of the tangible and intangible assets of the
enterprise. Accordingly, an insistence upon ordinary income for the entirety of
the return appears excessive. The overall appreciation in the value of the
enterprise may well have occurred even if the service provider never participated
in its growth. An effort to trace precisely the source of such appreciation would
be administratively burdensome, possibly impossible to accomplish, and thus
unworkable.
In isolating the human capital component of the overall return, another approach
is to utilize an appropriate surrogate through which to approximate what the
cost/value of procuring the services would have been and basing the annual or
total ordinary income component on that amount. If procuring the services on the
outside market from an unrelated third party would have cost $200,000, then this
figure could serve as the ceiling for the amount of ordinary income to be taken
into account. Anything in excess of that amount would qualify for preferential
treatment. 160
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This approach is favored by some, including the Levin Bill. See The Levin Propsal, supra note
20. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has also taken this approach. See Aron-Dine,
supra note 20.
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See, e.g., Aron-Dine, supra note 20, at 3 (asserting that if the business entity were a
corporation, rather than a partnership, the service provider would be an employee) and Fleischer,
supra note 2, at n.43 (comparing receipt of profits interest to an employee’s receipt of corporate
stock).
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Assuming a four-year period prior to disposition, the equity interest recipient would be required
to report $200,000 of ordinary income annually or, given the absence of funds in hand, the return
could be viewed as attributable to an open transaction and taxed only upon actual receipt. Thus,
the first $800,000 would be ordinary income and any excess entitled to capital gain. Of course,
problems are confronted if the overall receipt is less than the amount previously taken into
account for tax purposes. An offsetting loss or deduction would be required to make the service
provider whole.
A similar approach exists in § 704(e) regarding family partnerships. Thereunder, in order to
prevent a shifting of income from high-bracket to low-bracket taxpayers, the members’ distributive
shares must be determined after taking into account a reasonable amount as compensation for
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This approach prioritizes the return on the equity interest as attributable to
human capital. Additionally, it ignores the risk and uncertainty of receipt. Using
our models, the employee is certain of a specific return over time, with very little
risk as to its receipt. In the enterprise context, the service provider is assuming
real risk as to his or her return. Furthermore, any shortcoming in return may be
attributable to the other components of the value of the enterprise and unrelated
to the impact on the economic well being of the enterprise due to the efforts of
the equity holder.
The above-discussed approaches are premised on the assumption that the
return on human capital is attributable exclusively or predominantly to the
rendition of services. However, the funds which the service provider would have
otherwise extracted from the enterprise have instead remained in the enterprise.
To what extent, if any, is future appreciation in the enterprise attributable to the
extra amounts now available to the enterprise for investment and use in the
ongoing business activities? Should the service provider be viewed to some
extent as re-investing the foregone compensation in the operations of the
enterprise?
If the service provider is viewed as committing capital to the enterprise by leaving
his human capital entitlement for the use of the enterprise, different results
ensue. Accordingly, an argument could be made that the service provider has
contributed $200,000 per year to the partnership by failing to extract an amount
equivalent to a third-party salary. This could be conceptualized as a contribution,
in some measure, of invested capital.
Focusing on this side of the equation, other than the initial receipt of the equity
interest which augers for characterization as a return on human capital, any
return thereafter could constitute a return on invested capital which might be
taxed preferentially. Importantly, foregoing the withdrawal of funds from the
enterprise has economic significance and arguably converts them from human
capital to invested capital.
Other variations are possible utilizing a bifurcated approach in the year of receipt.
For example, if the value of the services is $200,000, $130,000 could be
attributable to human capital, i.e., the after tax amount in the pure employee
setting, and the remainder ($70,000) attributable to invested capital. 161 Utilizing
these ratios, taxation could be postponed until realization and, similar to the tax
services rendered by the donor, unless otherwise provided. See Willis, supra at note 4 at
chapters 2 and 9.
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In any case, the recipient will have to find other sources of funds with which to pay the
attendant tax liability. In contrast to the pure employee setting in which he or she has the cash
(most likely it has been withheld and paid directly to the Service), the service provider has
received only an ownership interest in an enterprise.
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treatment for installment sales, 65 percent would be attributable to human capital
taxed accordingly at ordinary rates, while the remaining 35 percent would be a
return on invested and taxed preferentially.
As illustrated, in the search for normative treatment, many possibilities present
themselves. Regardless of whether the issue of how to treat the overall return on
the compensatory receipt of an equity interest generates unanimity of opinion
from a tax policy standpoint, a number of differing approaches have some logical
basis for their adoption. However, the purity and simplicity of the employee
setting is replaced with complexity due to the difficulty of disentangling the
mixture of contributed human capital and the re-investment of the return as
invested capital. 162 As we have seen, in attempting to separate the two, current
tax policy errs on the side of treating the future return to the service provider as
one on invested capital, rather than human capital.
Importantly, many of the proposals for change ultimately resort to some
combination of human and invested capital as the source for the return on
compensatory transfers of equity interests. 163 It is conceptually difficult, if not
impossible, to deny that some portion of the return is entitled to preferential
treatment under the current law.
Once one accepts the fact that the normative treatment requires the recognition
of both components as producing the return, the status quo emerges as a strong
candidate for the proper treatment of such returns. The current tax law generally
bifurcates the return from compensatory transfers of equity interests into (1) a
return on human capital and hence ordinary income upon receipt and (2) a return
on invested capital, which depending upon the circumstances may generate
capital gain thereafter.
The tax policy rationale supporting the conversion feature for the five traditional
equity interests in the enterprise is the re-investment of human capital in the
enterprise. The failure to withdraw his or her return on human capital results in
an accumulation of funds in the enterprise which permits the re-investment of
that amount in the capital of the enterprise, with which it can invest and engage
in other activities furthering the goals of the profit-generating enterprise. At a
minimum, this entanglement of contributions to the enterprise explains why
Congress currently utilizes a combination treatment of the service provider in
these settings, selecting a cut-off point at which the return on human capital ends
and the return on invested capital begins.
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Some, while acknowledging that such complexity exists, propose solutions requiring the
bifurcation of human and invested capital, without any suggestion for how such separation could
be accomplished. See generally Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4.
163

Some, while suggesting that the baseline for the return should be ordinary income, conclude
that an elective provision affording conversion is preferred. See Fleischer infra note 2 at 16. But
see Gergen, infra note 170 (advocating ordinary income treatment for the entirety of the return).
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The issue is whether this current compromise treatment by Congress can be
improved. Critics, albeit exclusively in the context of profits interests, advance
various proposals to which I will add my own. However, once one accepts that
the proper treatment will be a blended one involving features of deferral and
conversion, the status quo becomes the front runner, if for no other reason than it
is the product of years of trial and error by Congress, Treasury, and the Service.

X. Reform Alternatives
Acknowledging the complexity of determining the normative treatment of these
tax issues, while minimizing their presence and continuation in the Code for more
than 50 years, critics, like our recent presidential candidates, conclude that
change is necessary. As a consequence, they advance a range of solutions to
the problem. 164

A. The Status Quo
Having concluded that “the status quo is an untenable position as a matter of tax
policy,” 165 some nevertheless address it directly and note that the status quo of
deferral and possible conversion has the benefit of “being predictable and wellunderstood.” 166 From a policy standpoint, an old tax is a good tax, because all
have come to accept it and have adjusted their activities accordingly.
Nevertheless, they speculate that existing subsidies through the use of a profits
interest lower the cost of capital for venture capital start ups and disadvantages
innovation for publicly-held corporations. 167 The status quo ensures
“gamesmanship” in the structuring of such investment vehicles, which efforts are
wasteful, increase agency costs, circumvents our progressive tax system, and
undermines “public confidence in the tax system.” 168
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Revealing the complexity of the issue, some assert that some conversion is acceptable
because an: “entrepreneurial risk subsidy of some sort arguably makes sense as a matter of tax
policy. The economics literature suggests that there are positive externalities associated with
entrepreneurship.” Fleischer, supra note 2, at 47. Accordingly, “some tax subsidy for
entrepreneurship will continue in any regime short of an endowment tax.” Id at 48.
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Id at 49.
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Id.
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Again, given this assertion, it is surprising that the increase in the number of new partnerships
is not larger than 5.7 percent per year. See supra note 91.
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Id at 50. By way of example, note the populist rage underlying the class warfare as expressed
by one critic: “Taxing labor income of fund managers at a low rate is a severe departure from
widely accepted norms, and it ought to be addressed.” Id. The problem is that the advocate
assumes that the income is derived from labor, which as previously discussed is not as clear as
he has determined. To the extent that public confidence is undermined, it may be attributable to
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However, as evidenced by a fuller exploration of the entirety of the area, the
status quo is far more defensible than acknowledged. Regarding the five types
of equity interests, under the status quo, deferral is justifiable for three given the
failure of the recipient to receive anything of value; conversion is justifiable in all
five by the re-investment of human capital rationale discussed above.
Furthermore, notwithstanding allegations to the contrary, the investment of
human capital in return for a profits interest frequently generates ordinary income
and thus is not entitled to a preferential tax rate. Similarly, invested capital in the
partnership context does not guarantee that the return will be taxed as capital
gain. Depending upon the business activities of the partnership, invested capital
can generate ordinary income.
Another unappreciated factor in an analysis of the status quo is that partnerships
are fundamentally different than corporations for tax purposes. The latter is
potentially subject to double taxation, while the former is taxed but once at the
partner level. The three types of equity interests in a partnership, once vested,
generate annual tax consequences. Furthermore, partnerships fall between sole
proprietorships and corporations on the business continuum. It should not be
surprising that the tax treatment of partnerships adopts a compromise between
the two extremes. Congress specifically adopted such an approach under
§ 702(b) in specifying that the income derived by a partnership is attributable to
all partners regardless of how they acquired their interests. 169
While other improvements may come to mind, at least with regard to those
offered to date, the status quo appears superior. As discussed below, it will be
even more so should my proposal for reform be adopted.

B. The Ordinary Income Method
For some, this is the simplest method for the proper treatment for the return on
the expenditure of human capital. 170 Under this approach, the receipt of a profits
interest constitutes an open transaction and distributions are taxed as ordinary
income regardless of the nature of the partnership’s business and investment
activities. 171
published academic articles, media accounts, and related comments that fail to integrate the
taxation of profits interests with the treatment accorded the other four types of compensatory
receipts of equity interests.
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See Fellows, supra note 85. See generally Willis et. al., supra at note 12, at ch 9.
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Mark P.Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L. Rev. 69
(1992). See also Aron-Dine, supra note 20 (advocating an entirely ordinary income approach)
and The Levin Proposal, supra note 20.
171

Such an approach overlooks the current distinction in Subchapter K between the derivation of
profits and the distribution of property. Possibly, it is assumed that the profit component will not
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Such treatment, i.e., taxation upon distribution, conflicts with current law which
forces income inclusion as earned by the partnership, not upon distribution.
Under this proposal, the service partner could derive greater deferral benefits
than are currently available by postponing the distribution of his share of the
business profits. Thus, with respect to the issue of deferral, the proposal would
not be an improvement in the tax treatment of such receipts. In fact, it would
generally extend the time for income realization, with additional complexity for its
integration into the earnings process.
The proposal eliminates the conversion potential for profits interest. However, as
previously discussed, the return on human capital through a profits interest
frequently produces ordinary income. Additionally, the failure of the service
provider to withdraw his or her share of earnings attributable to services can be
conceptualized as a contribution of invested capital. For partnerships, Year 1’s
profits, if not withdrawn, become Year 2’s capital.
Whether others would extend their proposed treatment to all compensatory
transfers of equity interests and treat all income derived therefrom as ordinary
income is unclear. The logic of their position suggests that they would, because
they assume that all returns on the investment of human capital generate
ordinary income.
With the adoption of such an approach, some have suggested planning
techniques through which the limitation could be circumvented. 172 For example,
a general partner could borrow funds and purchase a capital interest which would
achieve deferral and conversion, because the return would be derived from
invested capital rather than human capital. The problem with this circumvention
technique is that the planning device creates an unrealistic situation. 173 If the
equity recipient is providing services as well as capital, he or she will insist upon
be derived until the year in which the partnership is liquidated. Such an enterprise is the
exception rather than the norm. See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 19. Accordingly, complexity
arises with regard to ongoing enterprises, the distributions from which are not in sync with the
derivation of income. A switch to such an approach would be more complex than that of the
current law.
172

See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 51-52.
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Some undermine the initial assumption of the clarity between the return on human capital and
the return on invested capital by acknowledging that they may be intertwined, possibly
inextricably: “the challenge of precisely separating returns on human capital from returns on
investment capital suggests that rough justice might be an acceptable result.” Id at 51.
Compounding the confusion of their goal, i.e., the separation of returns on human capital from
returns on invested capital, they embrace the status quo of the Code by proposing elective
treatment to be determined by the taxpayer because an “elective approach would be consistent
with the tax Code’s general approach to executive compensation.” Id at 51-52. As I have
emphasized, this elective feature dramatically undercuts the effort to tax human capital
appropriately and should be repealed. See supra at notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
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a profits interest for the contributed human capital as well as a capital interest for
the invested capital.
Logically, such a proposal should be broadened and applied to all compensatory
transfers of equity interests in enterprises since the entirety of the contribution by
a service provider in their view is the rendition of services on behalf of the
enterprise. As illustrated previously, current law does not treat the entirety of the
return on the expenditure of human capital as ordinary income. Thus, the current
treatment of a compensatory profits interest is not as aberrational as suggested.
The adoption of the proposal would treat a profits interest in a more onerous
fashion than the other four compensatory transfers of equity interests in an
enterprise.

C. The Forced Valuation Method
Another proposal involves a greater emphasis on valuing the original receipt of a
profits interest in a partnership. 174 Accordingly, instead of relying on liquidation
value which invariably leads to a valuation of zero, some would broaden the
inquiry by taking other factors into account. While reducing deferral, conversion
would still be possible under this method. Proponents acknowledge that
everything would turn on valuation, which invariably provides opportunities
through which to minimize adverse consequences. 175
Unfortunately, as described earlier, such an approach ignores the implicit, if not
explicit, restrictions on the receipt of a profits interest. 176 Almost without
exception, it is conditioned upon the performance of services, something to be
done in the future. Until they are rendered, the marketability of the interest is
virtually non-existent.
Other computational difficulties are inherent in the proposal, which reveal why
liquidation value has been adopted as the governing standard under current law.
While not insurmountable, the possibility of “double taxation” is confronted.
Technically this is a misnomer because “homeostasis” will out. 177 Income would
174

Id at 59.

175

Id.

176

See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.

177

The system of Subchapter K operates in perfect fashion to ensure that in all cases the overall
result will balance out. If the original value were $100,000 and the recipient’s share of profits over
four years were $70,000, he would have been taxed on $170,000. His basis would increase both
on the initial taxing event and each year thereafter as profits were earned. Upon liquidation of his
interest for $70,000, his share of undistributed profits, he would incur an offsetting loss of
$100,000. Thus, he would have been taxed on $170,000 which would be offset by a loss of
$100,000 for a net profit from his ownership of the profits interest in the partnership of $70,000.
Obviously, time value and character considerations make this a less than desirable approach.

60

arise on valuation, leading to an equivalent amount of basis for the interest in the
partnership. As profits are earned (assuming they are undistributed), income is
allocated to the service provider and basis is increased. Upon liquidation, the
double taxing of the profits will be offset by a corresponding loss. Time value
issues will be implicated and, under the current statutory regime, one could
experience the opposite of the reformers’ concern—ordinary income reported
twice for tax purposes offset by a subsequent capital loss. 178
These concerns are seldom addressed. However, even proponents minimize the
worth of this particular reform proposal: “There is little reason to believe that
forcing valuation of partnership profits interests in this fashion would lead to a
more salutary result.” 179

D. The Cost-of-Capital Method
Under this approach, deferral would be reduced but conversion possibilities
would continue. 180 Advocates maintain that the cost-of-capital method provides
a greater risk subsidy, but minimizes the possibilities for manipulation. 181 Of
course, because conversion is possible, the proposal undercuts efforts at reform
and acknowledges the entanglement of human and invested capital in such
settings. Accordingly, any indictment of the status quo loses force.
Notwithstanding criticism of both the deferral and conversion possibilities of
returns on human capital, some reformers advance their own Solomonic solution.
Under this approach, recipients would be allocated an annual amount of ordinary
income determined by taking a specified market rate of interest times their
percentage interest in profits times the capital under management. 182
In essence, the opportunity for the service provider is conceptualized as the
functional equivalent of an interest-free loan. Employing § 7872, ordinary income
arises and is imputed annually as a compensatory receipt to the service provider.
For example, assume that the fund manager general partner invested
$5,000,000 in a $100,000,000 private equity firm. Using the cost-of-capital
approach and a six percent rate of interest, the general partner would be imputed
178
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$1,140,000 (6% x 20% x $95,000,000) of ordinary income annually attributable to
his percentage interest in profits times the capital contributions of the other
partners.
Ordinary income would accrue annually, resulting in an increase in the partner’s
basis for his partnership interest. All other activities of the partnership would be
governed by current law. Accordingly, should the partnership invest in preferred
assets, conversion to capital gain would remain possible.
Advocates characterize the proposal as one advancing the goal of neutrality,
which reduces agency costs and the deadweight loss arising from tax planning.
The approach “reduces the incentive to unduly favor partnership profits interests
over other economically equivalent forms of compensation, and it thus reduces
economic distortions in contract design and minimizes planning opportunities.” 183
In point of fact, the proposal would have negative consequences. While the
imputed income increases basis, actual profits derived by the partnership are
taken into account as well resulting in an additional acceleration of tax. The only
situation in which the “double taxation” would not arise would be years in which
the partnership produced no profits. 184 The increasing basis would give rise to
an offsetting loss upon liquidation, but the consequence would be greatly
deferred, possibly resulting in the most offensive of circumstances for an
entrepreneur—an acceleration and duplication of ordinary income offset at a later
point in time by a long-term capital loss.
The simplicity of the proposal deviates widely from the complexity rampant in
Subchapter K. First, it assumes a fixed profits interest in all items generated by
the partnership. In many partnerships, partners’ interests may vary according to
the type of income generated. Thus, the executive’s investment of human capital
may extend to only a portion of the partnership’s activities.
A final concern with the proposal is whether it encompasses all of the underlying
assumptions of the statutory safeguard which it models. The proposal and the
analogue of an interest free loan are distinguishable from that of the service
provider, because no advancement of funds in a loan context has taken place
between the parties.
If § 7872 is the model, 185 two events are deemed to have taken place. First,
foregone interest is deemed to have been transferred from the lender to the
borrower, which results in the imputed income to the fund manager of
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$1,140,000. However, a second component of the transaction is taken into
account as well, i.e., a return transfer of the determined amount to the lender as
the payment of interest. Taken to its logical extension, the amount included in
income is offset by the deemed payment of interest as is typically the case for
interest-free loans in a compensatory setting.
In order to avoid this quandary, some propose a basis adjustment instead of a
current deduction. While avoiding one problem, it creates another. “Double
taxation” with all of its difficulties is resurrected. Additionally, as discussed
previously, it is far from clear why one would override firmly established
principles of realization and substitute a proxy for what is actually taking place.
Given that the status quo performs the same disentanglement between human
capital and invested capital, i.e., segregating the initial portion of the transaction
as generating the return on human capital and the remainder as attributable to
invested capital, the status quo is superior because it involves actual rather than
putative results. 186

E. Talent-Revealing Election
This proposal combines the cost-of-capital proposal with the ordinary income
proposal. The default rule would be ordinary income, but the entrepreneur could
elect the cost-of-capital method. 187 Similar to the § 83(b) election, taxpayers
would make a judgment as to which approach would serve them best. Should
they have a strong preference for some conversion and some deferral, it would
be available. Basically, the proposal incorporates the features of two of the
previously discussed alternatives. 188
The difficulty with the proposal is that it dramatically undercuts its premise, i.e.,
because the Code has been less than precise in its taxation of human capital, it
is in need of reform by developing a system that more accurately isolates the
return on human capital and taxes it accordingly. 189 Given my prior criticism of
both proposals, their combination only increases, rather than decreases, the
deficiencies attendant to the proposal.
Giving the recipient a choice in how he or she wishes to report the receipt of a
compensatory equity interest grants him or her excessive and exclusive
autonomy over the tax treatment of the return. An election, by definition, will
produce different, rather than similar, results among similarly-situated taxpayers.
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Advocates celebrate its consistency with the status quo treatment under § 83 for
compensatory receipts of equity interests other than profits interests in
partnerships. 190 In doing so, they fail to detect the deviation from the normative
goal that exists in the elective provision under current law.

XI. A Modest Proposal
Surprisingly, none of the critics to date addresses the possible repeal of § 83(b)
while considering improvement to the current taxation of human capital. In fact,
some embrace elective choices as a positive, rather than a negative, feature of
the Code. They dispense with a valuation upon receipt approach for a profits
interest in a partnership, yet fail to recognize that the recipients of most restricted
compensatory transfers of equity interests avail themselves of such “topping off”
techniques under the current elective provision of § 83(b).
By doing so, the difference between the tax treatment on receipt of a profits
interest in a partnership and a restricted capital interest in a partnership or
restricted corporate stock is minimized, if not effectively eliminated. It is
surprising that, in assessing the perceived distortion in the proper treatment of
equity compensation, they would not demand such a reform.
Service providers in receipt of an entrepreneurial interest, if fully informed, almost
without exception elect the acceleration of ordinary income. 191 While sacrificing
deferral, the rewards of conversion are maximized. An entrepreneur does not
accept restricted stock unless he or she is confident that the period of service will
be fulfilled and is eager to “hitch his or her star” to a profitable endeavor. In the
typical case, if the enterprise is successful, vastly greater amounts of ordinary
income will be taken into account by the service provider without the election.
Deferral is not a determinative consideration in making the election. The greater
concern should be about the potential conversion of compensatory income into
preferential treatment, which the election improperly facilitates.
At a minimum, the election documents a congressional willingness to permit
conversion in compensatory transfers of equity interests at minimal cost. 192
Much of this treatment is attributable to the entanglement of, and difficulty in
separating, the amount of any return attributable to an investment of human
capital and the amount attributable to its re-investment in the enterprise, which is
treated as invested capital. Critics ignore the re-investment of human capital as
190
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constituting a return on invested capital in their effort to determine the amount of
the return attributable to human capital.
Of all aspects of the current tax law which could be reformed, the § 83(b) election
is most in need. While concerned about tax gamesmanship, some fail to
understand that the elective provision is at the heart of such abuse and would
target the most questionable aspect of the current law regarding compensatory
transfers of equity interests.
In determining when a return constitutes a return on human capital or a return on
invested capital, the least defensible approach from a tax policy standpoint is
permitting the return on human capital to be measured on the date of receipt,
before any of the services have been rendered, at a time when the only thing
which is certain is that the service provider lacks complete dominion and control
over the interest. Only through the passage of time and the ongoing rendition of
services will economic enhancement accrue. To permit an election which
determines the return on human capital before any of it has been rendered is
counter-intuitive.
Some have focused on the right issue, but the wrong target. With assistance
from Shakespeare, “the fault lies not with [profits interests], dear Brutus, but with
[§83(b)].” 193 Dramatic improvement in the policy principles for the taxation of
human capital can and should be made. The revenue gain from the elimination
of the election could be significant. More importantly, tax policy would be
advanced, similarly-situated parties would be treated consistently, the treatment
would extend equally to partnerships and corporations, and its implementation by
Congress would be simple, involving nothing more than the repeal of a mere
subsection of a single Code provision less than 170 words in length.

XII. Conclusion
Some assert that the current tax treatment of a compensatory transfer of a profits
interest in a partnership results in a widely-exploited tax subsidy. In fact, these
efforts have garnered Congressional attention. While unfortunately centered in a
struggle of class warfare, these efforts have begun to bear fruit, resulting in
various legislative offerings. 194 Furthermore, the popular press has embraced
the message, quoting multi-millionaires (or is it billionaires?) as questioning the
fairness of a tax system which taxes more heavily the wages of such individuals’
administrative assistants than the returns of such high-flying service providers. 195
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While these reform efforts fell short and were not enacted into law, possibly due
to the forthcoming elections of November, 2008, 196 predictions abound that the
“issue is likely to come up again as part of a debate over tax reform in 2009.” 197
Importantly, in revisiting the issue, the tax writing committees need to ignore the
populist calls for reforms and instead explore the structure of Subchapter K and
Subchapter C and determine the proper policy treatment for the taxation of
human capital in all contexts. Only through a consideration of the entirety of the
spectrum can there be a full appreciation of the tax treatment developed to date.
The difficulty with the current class warfare rhetoric is its myopic focus upon a
single industry and its inaccurate assumption that profits interests always
generate deferral and conversion. As has been illustrated, the deferral aspect of
the receipt of a profits interest comports with tax policy principles of realization,
valuation, and vesting. Furthermore, deferral in the partnership context is far
more abbreviated than it is in the corporate context. Regarding the conversion
feature, it is not unique to compensatory transfers of a profits interest. It equally
exists with respect to the other four traditional types of equity interests of
business enterprises. In fact, the conversion feature in the partnership context is
far more limited than it is in the corporate context.
The allegation that a compensatory profits interest receives preferential tax
treatment superior to the other four types of equity interests is erroneous.
Furthermore, instead of achieving the neutrality to which any tax system should
aspire, if the proposed treatment were adopted, virtually all other forms of
compensatory transfers of equity interests would generate tax results superior to
those of a profits interest in a partnership.
Notwithstanding the lack of theoretical or tax policy distinctions between profits
interests and carried interests, some call for selective application of reform only
to large investment partnerships, revealing a class warfare strategy as opposed
to a uniform overall improvement in the operation and application of the tax law.
Attack the superrich, even when their return on compensatory endeavors is
indistinguishable in every respect from the profits interest received by others
except for the number of dollars involved. Sound tax policy deserves more than
arbitrary line-drawing based on the number of zeros which follow the initial digit in
the amount of the compensatory return.
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Some boldly assert that the “status quo treatment of a profits interest in a
partnership is no longer a tenable position to take as a matter of sound tax
policy.” 198 Considering the above discussion, such a conclusion is questionable.
All five types of equity interests share common treatment with respect to the
issues of deferral and conversion. More importantly, upon studying the statutory
treatment of the entirety of compensatory equity transfers, one appreciates the
complexity encountered in attempting to determine what constitutes a return on
human capital and what constitutes a return on invested capital.
This conceptual challenge is particularly difficult in the case of a compensatory
receipt of an equity interest in an enterprise. Once a compensatory equity
interest is received, the clarity of the return on human capital begins to blur.
Human capital begets invested capital, which begets invested capital, which
begets invested capital, ad infinatum. Like conjoined twins, delineation between
the two is virtually impossible, and any attempt to disentangle them is fraught
with difficult obstacles.
As has been illustrated by the analysis of the advanced proposals, none appears
to be superior to the status quo. In fact, the current tax treatment of the issue,
with some slight improvement, may be the “second best’ solution to the difficulty
encountered in segregating the respective components of the overall financial
return from the receipt of compensatory equity interests in an enterprise.
Returns on human capital, if not withdrawn, generate invested capital throughout
the period of equity ownership by the service provider. The value of the interest,
provided the enterprise proves profitable, becomes attributable to the investment
of both human capital and invested capital. Disentangling the two could be
accomplished by any number of means. However, upon recognizing that the
return is neither attributable exclusively to human capital nor invested capital, the
current status quo has as much justification for its continuation as the adoption of
other proposals.
The current tax treatment of such recipients produces a reasonable compromise,
reflecting the re-investment of human capital which becomes invested capital.
While it may begin as one, it transforms into another. The governing structure of
the Code provides clear and certain rules for the taxation of returns as ordinary
income or capital gain in the context of partnership and corporate transactions.
Similarly, the law has addressed the range of compensatory transfers including
the receipt of profits interests, restricted stock, etc.
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As illustrated above, unifying themes bind the various available compensatory
techniques and profits interests, whether termed carried interests or otherwise,
are consistent therewith. Once evaluated in the overall context, it is apparent that
the hue and cry over private equity funds is much ado about nothing. Ironically,
as our economic meltdown continues, instead of withdrawing incentives to
rehabilitate underperforming businesses, Congress may actually be forced to
consider increasing the benefits associated with risk taking.
Nevertheless, reform opportunities in the area present themselves. The election
of § 83(b), which permits an undervaluation of the return on human capital before
it has even been received, is a far more serious affront to the proper tax
treatment for compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise than the
current tax treatment for profits interests in a partnership. Yet, there appears to
have been deafening silence regarding its deviation from what normative tax
treatment should be. The repeal of § 83(b) would constitute meaningful tax
reform with regard to the proper taxation of human capital.

68

